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I. INTRODUCTION
An emerging common wisdom holds that courts have made it “too
hard” to obtain patent protection in critical industries. The origin of this
criticism dates back at least as far as the United States Supreme Court’s
2012 landmark opinion in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc.1 which (the argument goes) triggered a chain
reaction of judicial opinions rendering patent rights progressively more

1. 566 U.S. 66, 92 (2012). In Mayo, the Court invalidated a patent claim directed at
determining the proper dosage of a thiopurine drug used to treat patients with autoimmune
disease. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer held that the claim failed to satisfy the
requirement of patentable subject matter because it was directed to a “law of nature.” Id. In
2014, the Supreme Court continued its expansion of the doctrine and invalidated a claim in
the software field for failing the Mayo test for patentable subject matter. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd.
v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 210 (2014). In Alice, the Supreme Court held that the Mayo
test also prohibited patenting abstract ideas.
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difficult to secure.2 Two years later, the Supreme Court decided Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank,3 another opinion widely viewed as restricting patent
rights.4 And, barely three years after Mayo, the Federal Circuit cited it
in invalidating a patent for a groundbreaking diagnostic test to detect
fetal genetic conditions such as Down Syndrome early in pregnancy. 5
Before the test at issue was available, clinical diagnostic methods
involved invasive techniques that materially endangered the health of
the fetus.6 But in 1996, doctors at Sequenom, Inc., a biotechnology
company, discovered that maternal blood contains trace amounts of
fetal DNA.7 Having made this discovery, the same team developed a
noninvasive blood test that could screen for fetal genetic conditions
without endangering the fetus.8 Sequenom’s invention garnered it
significant acclaim and prestigious awards for medical innovation.9 The
Federal Circuit was somewhat less impressed, and it invalidated the
patent for failure to assert claims that were “significantly more” than a
mere natural law.10
Critics were quick to pounce.11 Invention is already risky and
costly enough, they argued, and this opinion made patent protection not
only harder but also unpredictable, undermining the incentives to

2. See, e.g., Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics, 859 F.3d 1352, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2621 (2018) (finding a testing process created by the
Cleveland Clinic to determine the risk for having atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease
invalid because it was directed to a patent-ineligible law of nature); Athena Diagnostics, Inc.
v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 915 F.3d 743, 753 (Fed. Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.
855 (2020) (finding a diagnostic method claim patent ineligible as a natural law).
3. 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
4. Id. at 219 (finding claims directed to a computerized system and method for exchanging
financial obligations are ineligible subject matter for patenting and consequently invalid).
5. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1375–77 (Fed. Cir. 2015),
reh’g en banc denied, 809 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2511 (2016).
6. Id. at 1373, 1381.
7. Id. at 1373.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1381 (referring to the invention as “groundbreaking,” stating that “The Royal
Society lauded this discovery as ‘a paradigm shift,’” and noting that “the inventors' article
describing this invention has been cited well over a thousand times”).
10. Id. at 1377 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S.
66, 79 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also David J. Kappos, This U.S. Court
Decision Just Quashed Innovation in Health Care, FORTUNE (Oct. 21, 2015, 4:48 PM),
https://fortune.com/2015/10/21/sequenom-ariosa-diagnostics-patent/
[https://perma.cc/DHJ7-8T35] (“[T]he Federal Circuit’s decision in June that declared a wide
swath of healthcare innovation unpatentable threatens to impose just this sort of stagnation.”).
Despite approximately twenty amici briefs from academics, industry, and interest groups who
argued that patent protection is necessary for such inventions, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari. Ariosa Diagnostics, 136 S. Ct. at 2511.
11. See, e.g., David O. Taylor, Patent Eligibility and Investment, 41 CARDOZO L. REV.
2018, 2022 (2019); Halie Wimberly, The Changing Landscape of Patent Subject Matter
Eligibility and Its Impact on Biotechnological Innovation, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 995, 995 (2017)
(“This roadblock to intellectual property protection for biotechnological inventions, due both
to the recent restrictions and to the uncertain legal standard, may slow growth of the industry
that relies heavily on investment.”).
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develop and finance critical new inventions.12 As a result, they feared,
risk-averse inventors and investors would stay away in droves, unjustly
and inefficiently depriving society of many ground-breaking inventions
such as Sequenom’s. As Judge Kimberly Moore of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained it in a recent dissent:
The math is simple, you need not be an economist to
get it: Without patent protection to recoup the
enormous R&D cost, investment in diagnostic
medicine will decline. To put it simply, this is bad. It
is bad for the health of the American people and the
health of the American economy.13
The criticism recounted above seems intuitive, appealing, and
powerful. But is it right? In this article, we interrogate it by deploying
experimental methods to measure people’s attitudes toward risk when
investing in innovative activities. Although our inquiry produces a
variety of insights, one in particular stands out: We uncover novel
evidence that when confronted with an investment decision that is
“innovation-related,” people appear to become far more tolerant of
risks than they are in other, economically equivalent settings. This
result appears to be significant and robust, and it holds up regardless of
whether one controls for subjects’ age, gender, ethnicity, or several
metrics of baseline risk aversion. Our results also persist when we vary
the quantitative and qualitative risks involved, so long as the investment
is tied to innovation. The effect appears to weaken substantially,
however, when a risky option is framed simply as an investment
opportunity, shorn of any invention-related dimension. Our
interpretation of these findings is that the pursuit of invention — in
concert with investing — introduces a critical interaction that operates
to dampen people’s manifest aversion to risk. In fact, we can even
impute a quantitative size of this preference-dampening effect, by

12. See The State of Patent Eligibility in America, Part II: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Intell. Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 6–7 (2019) (statement of Hans
Sauer, Deputy Gen. Couns. & Vice President for Intell. Prop., Biotechnology Innovation
Org.) (“Absent the ability to protect their discoveries with valid patents . . . companies would
lack the necessary incentive to make the risky, expensive, and time-consuming investments
in research and development often required to bring new technologies to market.”); The State
of Patent Eligibility in America, Part III: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intell. Prop. of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 1 (2019) (statement of Robert Deberardine, Chief
Intell. Prop. Couns., Johnson & Johnson) (“It is only because of the United States patent
system, and the predictability that it has historically provided, that we have been able to make
the investments, conduct the research, and take the risks required to develop these
treatments. . . . Unfortunately, the patent system in the United States today is anything but
predictable.”).
13. Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 915 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 2019),
reh’g en banc denied, 927 F.3d 1333, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (Moore, J., dissenting).
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calibrating our results to a well-known set of risk tolerance
measurement techniques in the economics literature.14 Here, for the
median subject in our study, we estimate that the innovation-related
frame induces a reduction of manifest risk aversion of just under onehalf of a standard deviation relative to our overall subject population. 15
To the extent that our results are generalizable, they have obvious
implications for the “Goldilocksian” conundrum of patent
protection — balancing the need to incentivize investors and inventors
against the economic distortions from granting limited property rights
to successful innovators. If inventors, entrepreneurs, and investors are
comparatively more tolerant of risk in inventive settings, then patent
policy may be able to incentivize value-enhancing innovation without
throwing in a “premium” to compensate investors for their aversion to
risk. Moreover, our results have broad implications outside of
intellectual property, and in particular to the fast-developing areas of
commercial and corporate law that must similarly wrestle with the
question of how richly to incentivize financial investors in innovative
industries.
Several caveats to our analysis deserve specific mention before
proceeding. First, as with all experimental findings, ours are subject to
questions about the generalizability of our results in light of the subject
pool. All of our experiments make use of either university students or
workers on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform (“M-Turk”).16
Consequently, one might fairly question the representativeness of our
subject pool relative to real-world inventors and investors, who actually
participate in day-to-day innovation markets. The use of M-Turkers is
sometimes singled out for criticism in this regard within the
experimental literature, since it represents a population that is less
capable of experimental control than conventional lab subjects. 17 We
confront these concerns along multiple fronts. Foremost, we make sure
to compensate our subjects with real monetary payoffs, so as to
motivate and induce them to internalize the core financial tradeoffs we
14. We calibrate manifested risk aversion using a common benchmarking first established
by Charles Holt and Susan Laury. See infra Part I; Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, Risk
Aversion and Incentive Effects, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1644, 1651–53 (2002).
15. In addition, because our results hold even in the presence of presenting subjects with
the possibility of negative payoffs, our results contrast with (though do not directly contradict)
the predictions of Nobel Prize winning work by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, who
found that preferences in the presence of negative payoffs (relative to a reference point)
behave fundamentally differently from those with strictly positive payoffs. Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE
453, 457–58 (1981).
16. See AMAZON MECH. TURK, www.mturk.com [https://perma.cc/YA2H-XR3P].
17. See generally Matthew J. C. Crump, John V. McDonnell & Todd M. Gureckis,
Evaluating Amazon's Mechanical Turk as a Tool for Experimental Behavioral Research, 8
PLOS
ONE
e57410
(Mar.
13,
2013),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0057410
[https://perma.cc/3CKK-ENGT] (reviewing the literature).

196

Harvard Journal of Law & Technology

[Vol. 34

wish to study. Additionally, our dual-population study design allows us
to draw comparisons between the university and M-Turk populations.
Although we confirm the existence of differences (both demographic
and behavioral) between these two populations,18 the phenomenon of
interest here (i.e., how innovation framing interacts with risk
tolerances) remains remarkably consistent between the groups. 19
Although we cannot guarantee that these results would carry over to all
real-world actors, their persistence across multiple distinct subject
pools is at the very least encouraging.
Second, although we believe our results deliver an important
rejoinder to recent criticisms about courts’ burgeoning stinginess
towards patent holders, they do so in a particular and focused way: by
showing that accommodations for risk preferences are perhaps
unnecessary (or at least less necessary than one might think) in
innovation-related contexts. A related but distinct criticism of the
judicial opinions noted above is that they have simply made it
costlier — even for a risk-neutral actor — to innovate or finance
innovation because, for example, copying is insufficiently deterred.
Our results have little to say about this dimension of the debate, other
than to suggest that we may be able to confront the cost problem on its
own terms, without also having to make significant additional
allowances for risk aversion.
The remainder of this Article consists of four parts. Part I discusses
the motivation and background for our study, with particular emphasis
on the oft-asserted argument that, within innovative industries, legal
policy should accommodate risk aversion much like in other domains.
Part II provides an overview of the experimental protocol, tying it to
the relevant literature. Part III presents our core results, both for our
baseline experiment and for a set of robustness experiments meant to
stress test our core results to different environments. Part IV turns to
implications, situating our findings within a variety of central legal
puzzles regarding innovation. A series of appendices contain
background technical derivations and provide additional statistical
results.

18. Most notably, in addition to their demographic differences, M-Turkers manifest greater
risk aversion, regardless of frame, than students on the Internet and in the lab. See infra
Section VA.4
19. Although there are many papers exploring whether results on M-Turk are different
from those in the lab, see supra note 110, we have not identified any that consider the sort of
framing that we utilize. Our results appear to confirm that — despite their various observable
differences from conventional subjects — M-Turkers can be used successfully to test the
types of framing manipulations studied in this Article.
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II. BACKGROUND
Before diving into our experimental enterprise, we first lay the
foundation by providing a little background and context for our
analysis. This Part describes the contours of some of the core behavioral
theories that undergird much of intellectual property law and policy,
focusing principally on patents. It further explores the assumptions that
other scholars have made about the risks associated with intellectual
property, including risks surrounding copying and risks surrounding
creation. It then situates these theories against the literature on earlystage startup investing in technology firms, where — despite the
asserted risks — there has long been significant appetite to invest.
Finally, we provide the reader with a brief orientation on the
experimental framing in psychology and behavioral economics to
better motivate and elucidate our experimental design.
A. Intellectual Property
The field of intellectual property (IP) is broadly comprised of
patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. Patent law is the
most relevant for this article, though our results have something to say
about copyrights as well. Patent rights provide the ability to exclude
others from the marketplace, and in so doing grant patent owners a
limited monopoly right.20 Such rights are ostensibly awarded by the
government to reward and incentivize invention.21 Copyrights —
which are justified on a similar economic theory as patents — protect
original works of authorship, such as books and music.22
There are numerous junctures in the IP literature where incentives
and risk preferences of the relevant actors are thought to play an
important role for law and policy. We consider several of them below.
1. Incentives for Inventing and Creating
A longstanding literature in economics, as well as in sociology and
psychology, attempts to explain why individuals and firms generate
new creative and innovative works. 23 The classic insight from
economic theory is that providing ex ante incentives (such as the
limited exclusive rights embodied by patents) are necessary to
20. See MARTIN J. ADELMAN, RANDALL R. RADER & GORDON P. KLANCNIK, PATENT
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 12 (1st ed. 2008).
21. See id. at 4–5 (describing how patents create an incentive to invent).
22. See PETER S. MENELL, MARK A. LEMLEY & ROBERT P. MERGES, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2020 VOL. II: COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS
AND STATE IP PROTECTIONS 508 (2020).
23. See, e.g., Jie He & Xuan Tian, Institutions and Innovation: A Review of Recent
Literature, 12 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON 377 (2020).
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encourage socially valuable generation of new works. This economic
account, in turn, subdivides into two parts. First, absent legal
protection, successful inventors would face the prospect of copying.24
Once an inventor has sunk the time and effort needed to produce the
innovation, others may endeavor to copy it, competing against the
original inventor and reducing her profits. In this way, the monetizable
value of a costly innovation theoretically can be driven down to almost
nothing. And, anticipating such copying, the inventor simply chooses
not to innovate in the first instance. By preventing copying, then, IP
rights catalyze innovative effort.
Second, the innovation process itself is generally quite
unpredictable, and thus — the argument goes — patent rights might
additionally be used to confront the fact that inventors might otherwise
gravitate to less risky pursuits. The late Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow,
for example, argued that risk-aversion may lead to under-investment in
inventive activity.25 According to this theory, the ostensibly lucrative
monopoly-like rights provided by the patent system can supply an
additional “premium” to compensate would-be innovators for taking on
this risk, motivating them to innovate in ways that are socially
desirable. This basic economic theory is no stranger to United States
Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., a
well-known case that discussed the purposes of intellectual property
law, the Supreme Court famously remarked: “[t]he patent laws . . .
[offer] a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to
inventors to risk the often-enormous costs in terms of time, research,
and development.”26 A central focus of this Article is this second aspect
of the economic theory.
Outside of financial incentives, the IP literature also suggests other
motivators of innovation, including reputational effects, career
rewards, and a variety of intrinsic motivations.27 For instance, some
individuals derive entertainment value from solving puzzles — an
activity that can also lead (when appropriately directed) to innovation
even as it provides intrinsic satisfaction and motivation to the
inventor.28 Similarly, employees within a firm may be motivated by
opportunities for promotion rather than direct pecuniary benefits from
24. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031, 1043 (2005).
25. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609,
616 (1962).
26. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
27. See, e.g., Saul Lach & Mark Schankerman, Incentives and Invention in Universities,
39 RAND J. ECON. 403, 422 (2008).
28. Alice Lam, What Motivates Academic Scientists to Engage in Research
Commercialization: ‘Gold’, ‘Ribbon’ or ‘Puzzle’? 40 RSCH. POL’Y 1354, 1365 (2011); see
also JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 14 (2014).
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patenting.29 Our analysis is tangentially related to these motivations as
well, at least insofar as non-monetary incentives are similarly affected
by risk aversion.
2. Risk Preferences of Individuals and Firms with Respect to Creating
Because risk plays a central role in shaping innovation markets,
and because inventors are thought to require compensation for taking
on such risk, the task of calibrating how much compensation is required
looms large for legal policy. As would-be innovators’ aversion to risk
grows, so too would the size of the patent premium needed to motivate
them. Unfortunately, there is scant empirical or experimental evidence
on the risk preferences of individuals and firms within the innovation
ecosystem. As we discuss below, to the extent the IP literature takes on
the issue, much of it appears to assume that creators, inventors, and
investors in innovation are risk-averse in a manner similar to anyone
else (although a minority of scholars sometimes conjecture the
opposite — that creators and inventors are risk-seeking). Below we
review and synthesize some of the major contributions in this area.
Joseph Stiglitz, yet another Nobel laureate, articulates the
canonical view that “[p]eople and firms are risk averse, and if they have
to bear risk, they have to be compensated for doing so.”30 Under this
view, potential creators and others in the innovation system are afflicted
with risk aversion just like anyone else. Without the financial premiums
promised by the patent and copyright systems, the argument goes, riskaverse creators will engage in sub-optimal levels of creative activity.
Steven Horowitz makes a similar claim about copyright, arguing that
copyright holders are “risk averse, valuing clear entitlements more than
equivalent murky ones.”31
Analogizing to the American mineral system for public lands, in
1977 Edmund Kitch propounded the “prospect theory” of patents,
which conceives of patent-related R&D as somewhat akin to gold
prospecting, and asserting that patent rights are useful in channeling
and coordinating development activities in new technologies.32 By
29. Matthew S. Clancy & GianCarlo Moschini, Incentives for Innovation: Patents, Prizes,
and Research Contracts, 35 APPLIED ECON. PERSP. & POL’Y, 206, 217–18 (2013) (“[I]f
scientists are relatively risk-neutral or are talented enough that the probability of successful
outcome is high, the optimal contract is tightly tied to performance. . . . [A] scientist may
choose . . . to do research in a field because it is populated with scientists who can certify their
work.”).
30. Joseph A. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE
L.J. 1693, 1723–24 (2008).
31. Steven J. Horowitz, Copyright’s Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 331, 334
(2012).
32. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 266 (1977). Kitch’s prospect theory is analytically distinct from Kahnemann &
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awarding exclusivity shortly after invention, Kitch’s prospect theory
asserts that the patent system provides the first inventor with an
incentive to develop the broad field of invention.33 Other scholars note
that prospect theory implicitly presupposes a risk-averse inventor who
needs strong property rights to be incentivized to develop the field. 34
It is important to note that not all IP commentators are convinced
that creators are relatively risk-averse on average, and some in fact
assert the opposite. F.M. Scherer, for example, advanced a “lottery
theory” of patents, analogizing them to lottery tickets, with most
patents being essentially worthless and a small minority of them having
substantial value.35 Building upon Joseph Schumpeter’s theory that
investors overestimate their chances of success when presented with a
potentially great reward,36 Scherer posited that potential inventors are
idiosyncratically incentivized to create new inventions by the remote
chance of garnering a large payoff from a patent.37 Gideon
Parchomovsky and R. Polk Wagner situate (and ultimately criticize)
this argument in broader organizational contexts, noting that “the
lottery theory critically depends on the assumption that inventors, like
lottery ticket buyers, are risk-seeking — indeed, so risk-seeking that
they are willing to engage in an activity with a negative expected
value.”38 Nevertheless, Parchomovsky and Wagner argue, it is firms,
and not individuals, that pursue most patents, thereby diffusing much
of the lottery-theory effect, since “the decisions of corporate managers
appear both rational and even risk-averse.”39
In short, while most voices in the IP chorus appear to have
coalesced around the proposition that primary actors in patent settings
are risk-averse, it is not difficult to isolate dissonant voices, asserting
contrary positions across the spectrum. Perpetuating and amplifying
Tversky’s prospect theory, published two years later, regarding the predictable results of a
lottery. See Daniel Kahnemann & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 284–86 (1979).
33. Kitch, supra note 32, at 266.
34. See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent
Bargain Metaphor after Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1329 (2004) (“Given the
support for risk-seeking behavior, inventors . . . may actually prefer a strong form of patent
law that richly rewards successful inventors rather than a form that seeks to protect
unsuccessful inventors who survive through imitation.”).
35. See F. M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 3 (Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); see also Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting
Behavioral Economics for the Common Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 142 (2008)
(“The majority of issued patents are relatively worthless, as the holder never asserts, licenses,
or even leverages the asset. . . . [O]nly a few are highly valuable.”).
36. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 73–74
(1942).
37. Scherer, supra note 35, at 15–16.
38. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 25
(2005).
39. Id. at 5 n.4, 58.
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this heterogeneity is the fact that there is little reliable data about how
or whether risk aversion manifests within intellectual property settings,
and most of what does exist seems frustratingly inconclusive.40 Perhaps
the most well-known study on this score was authored by Thomas
Åstebro, who examined a sample of approximately one thousand
Canadian inventions that had been evaluated for commercialization
potential by a non-profit organization, the Canadian Innovation Centre
(CIC).41 Åstebro surveyed the inventors many years after the CIC
evaluation to learn whether they had commercialized after receiving the
CIC evaluation, and if so, what the return on investment was. 42 He
reported that independent inventors tended to develop and
commercialize even inventions that were projected to have negative
expected returns.43 In other words, these individuals continued to invest
time and money in their inventions in a manner that would have been
better spent elsewhere. Why might this be so? Åstebro concludes that
“[r]isk-seeking is one of several plausible reasons why so many
inventors proceed to develop their inventions while only a small
fraction can reasonably expect to earn positive returns on their efforts.
Another plausible explanation is that inventors are unrealistic optimists
in that they overestimate their abilities to succeed.”44
Risk preferences also play an important role in understanding the
incentives of those who license IP from others. For example, these
parties may similarly make their licensing choices in a manner that
reflects the risk of liability for infringement. Robert Merges points to
“risk aversion” as the reason a potential patent infringer may pay a
higher rate or fee for a license than that which would be justified by a
traditional economic analysis.45 Jeanne Fromer makes a similar
argument, not about the royalty rate, but about entering into licenses in
the first instance. According to Fromer, competitors take patent licenses
because they are risk-averse about potential liability.46
Although patent law is the central focus of this article, our
arguments extend beyond it. Several scholars and courts, for example,
consider the patent and copyright law as being closely intertwined. 47
40. See Andres Sawicki, Risky IP, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 81, 120 (2016) (“Existing empirical
work provides some support for this [risk tolerance] hypothesis, although it is inconclusive.”).
41. See Thomas Åstebro, The Return to Independent Invention: Evidence of Unrealistic
Optimism, Risk Seeking or Skewness Loving?, 113 ECON. J. 226, 227 (2003).
42. Id. at 228.
43. Id. at 227.
44. Id. at 236.
45. Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives
on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 867 n.260 (1988).
46. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 751
(2009).
47. See, e.g., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 763 (2011)
(considering case law from copyright law to interpret Section 271(b) of the Patent Act
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This is in part because both areas of law draw their authority from the
same clause in the U.S. Constitution.48 But even on a more functionalist
level, risk aversion appears to play a similar motivating role in the
copyright literature. James Gibson, for example, writes that “the
decision-makers in the real world of copyright practice are typically
risk-averse” and that new copyrightable works require “high upfront
investment” and only a “prospect” at profits, reflecting the risk of
creation failure.49 But Gibson also ties the risk-aversion to liability for
infringement, saying that decision makers “approach legal issues very
conservatively, particularly issues like copyright liability, which have
the potential to delay or even destroy the entire project.”50 Fromer also
posits that fear of copyright liability causes particular problems because
authors are risk-averse. She opines that “risk-averse authors might
frequently avoid modifying works in ways that ought to be construed
as fair uses or secure an unnecessary license authorizing this
modification.”51
On the other hand, Andres Sawicki nicely explains the state of the
research into risk tolerances relating to copyright (and intellectual
property more broadly). While noting the empirical evidence is often
inconclusive and scant, Sawicki hypothesizes that creators have a
greater tolerance for risk than the general population.52 The reasoning
is that creative individuals prefer riskier environments because such
environments open up more avenues for creativity than less risky
ones.53 Sawicki further speculates that the risk preferences of creators
might affect which form of incentive — IP rights, prizes, grants, and
tax credits — would be societally optimal.54 But in the end, all of this
is admittedly conjecture: As Sawicki himself emphasizes, the empirical
evidence has not been uniform.55
regarding inducing infringement); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417
(1984) (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)) (noting that
copyright law, like patent law, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration); J.H.
Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a
Restructured International Intellectual Property System, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475,
508–12 (1984).
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
49. James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L.J. 882, 891 (2007).
50. Id.
51. Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745,
1820 (2012).
52. See Sawicki, supra note 40, at 81.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 88.
55. Id. at 85. One article is tangential to our experiment — Hans Hvide and Georgios Panos
used stock market investment participation by Norwegian investors as a proxy for risk
tolerance, and then showed that individuals with higher manifest risk tolerance are more likely
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Backing up a layer, what do we know about the risk tolerances of
the firms organizing and underwriting IP? Here, available data is
similarly scant and somewhat open to interpretation, but a few
observations warrant consideration. As is well known, the venture
capital (VC) investment model is one that dominates innovation
markets, with portfolio-company entrepreneurs and VC investors
contracting over investments designed to propel the startup onto the
right trajectory for a lucrative exit event, such as initial public offering
or acquisition.56 It is also well known that this trajectory is fraught with
risk: a familiar statistic in the tech industry is that nine out of ten VCbacked startups fail.57 Moreover, neither employees nor VC investors
are easily able to diversify away their economic risks: Human capital
investments are generally undiversifiable by definition, and venture
capital funds must still concentrate their investments on a handful of
illiquid equity positions.58
On first blush, an industry with a significant amount of
undiversifiable risk would appear to be an unattractive target for riskaverse entrepreneurs and investors. Or at the very least, one might
expect financial market participants to demand substantial risk premia

to become entrepreneurs. Hans K. Hvide & Georgios A. Panos, Risk Tolerance and
Entrepreneurship, 111 J. FIN. ECON. 200, 200 (2014). Their identification strategy hinges on
consistency of preferences over time and across contexts. See id. at 203 (“An implicit
assumption . . . is that the risk preference parameter r is stable over time and across decision
problems. This assumption is debatable.”). Our study, in contrast, demonstrates that risk
preferences may not be consistent over time or across contexts. Also, we do not directly test
entrepreneurship itself, but rather willingness to invest in risky entrepreneurial projects more
heavily in one’s stock market portfolio choices.
56. Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 164, 167 (2019); see
also Brian Kingsley Krumm, Fostering Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Shark Tank
Shouldn’t Be the Model, 70 ARK. L. REV. 553, 561–69 (2017) (describing the history and
model of venture capitalist investment).
57. This statistic is quite pervasive throughout the tech industry. See, e.g., Erin Griffith,
Why Startups Fail, According to Their Founders, FORTUNE (Sept. 25, 2014, 3:00 PM),
https://fortune.com/2014/09/25/why-startups-fail-according-to-their-founders/
[https://perma.cc/XZM9-LTTJ]; Neil Patel, 90% of Startups Fail: Here’s What You Need to
Know About the 10%, FORBES (Jan. 16, 2015, 10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
neilpatel/2015/01/16/90-of-startups-will-fail-heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-10/
[https://perma.cc/WP72-5YAU]. However, studies have suggested that while venture
capitalist startups tend to have high failure rates, those rates likely do not reach ninety percent.
See, e.g., Yael V. Hochberg, Alexander Ljungqvist & Yang Lu, Whom You Know Matters:
Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance, 62 J. FIN. 251, 263–64 (2007)
(finding that companies who received their first institutional funding round between 1980 and
1999 failed about one-third of the time); Deborah Gage, The Venture Capitalist Secret: 3 Out
of 4 Start-Ups Fail, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2012, 12:01 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443720204578004980476429190
[https://perma.cc/Q4R6-GA42] (finding that 75% of companies receiving venture funding
failed from 2004 to 2010).
58. For example, Professor Gompers and Professor Lerner observed that VC funds
typically invest in at most two dozen firms over their lifetime. Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner,
An Analysis of Compensation in the U.S. Venture Capital Partnership, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 6
(1999).
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to tie up their capital in such illiquid purgatories. And yet, the venture
capital industry has been vibrant for over three decades and continues
to thrive, particularly in the innovation industries.59 It is difficult to
explain the explosiveness of this sector in the presence of significant
individual risk aversion among its principal participants. And indeed,
while VC investors tend to earn attractive returns (a possible marker of
market risk aversion), several commentators have noted that the return
premiums for VC investors appear comparatively modest when
compared to equivalently risky investments, particularly in the last
decade.60 This phenomenon appears to hold true even though many of
the same actors also routinely exhibit more conventional (risk-averse)
tendencies in their other investment activities.61
The confluence of a vibrant VC market and generally risk-averse
investors is easier to understand if risk tolerances interacted
meaningfully with the domain of innovation. For example, if investors
were more tolerant of risks in an innovation-related setting, then they
would not demand compensation for risk-bearing to the same degree as
in an analogous setting outside innovation industries. As such, it would
make the longevity of the VC-backed industries much more
understandable, as well as the seemingly inconsistent behavior of
individual investors across segments — willing to gamble in innovation
industries but shunning risk elsewhere.62

59. The private capital database Pitchbook, for example, documents that the total number
of VC deals in innovative industries within the United States has more than tripled during the
past few years, from 9,090 deals in 2010 to its peak of 29,202 deals in 2018, with the number
remaining relatively constant afterwards. Moreover, total capital invested has been on a
constant rise, reaching its peak in 2018 with $734.97 billion in capital raised. In 2019 there
were $565.04 billion raised, a threefold increase from 2010 with $192.94 billion. See
PITCHBOOK, www.pitchbook.com [https://perma.cc/4MAR-QPHA].
60. See, e.g., Raphael Amit, Lawrence Glosten & Eitan Mueller, Entrepreneurial Ability,
Venture Investments, and Risk Sharing, 36 MGMT. SCI. 1232, 1243 (1990) (developing a
theoretical model that shows risk-averse entrepreneurs with differential ability will want to
have VC investors who are risk-neutral); cf. Michael Ewens, Charles Jones & Matthew
Rhodes-Kropf, The Price of Diversifiable Risk in Venture Capital and Private Equity, 26 REV.
FIN. STUD. 1853, 1856–57 (2013) (reviewing the literature that shows that the large returns
demanded by VC funds are not only compensating for risk, but also contain pure excess
returns driven by agency cost considerations).
61. Ben Walther, The Peril and Promise of Preferred Stock, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 161, 204
(“Holders of preferred stock are also naturally risk-averse, since they participate in losses but
not in gains; they can be expected to be unhappy with the board if it takes risks.”); see also
Brendan Coffey, Venture Capitalists Become Risk Averse, FORTUNE (Oct. 20, 2011, 5:48
PM),
https://fortune.com/2011/10/20/venture-capitalists-become-risk-averse/
[https://
perma.cc/Q42E-ERBG]; cf. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Characteristics, Contracts,
and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses, 59 J. FIN. 2177, 2208 (2004)
(assessing the effect of internal and external risks on venture capitalist decision-making).
62. Cf. Ewens et al., supra note 60, at 1883 (describing the “idiosyncratic risk” resulting
from “[u]navoidable principal-agent problems . . . combined with the need for investment
oversight”).
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3. Prior Related Experiments on Intellectual Property.
Having reviewed some of the conceptual literature related to
innovation markets and risk aversion, here we touch briefly on the
growing amount of experimental work in the IP field. There is some
prior work here complementary to our enterprise, but none of it appears
to be right on point.63 Perhaps the closest exploration to our own was
conducted by Christopher Buccafusco and Christopher Sprigman, who
ran a series of experiments designed to test for the existence and size of
the “endowment effect” in intellectual property rights.64 The
endowment effect is a well-known (and oft-debated) phenomenon in
behavioral psychology, asserting that people tend to value rights (or
initial “endowments”) more when they already own them, as opposed
to when they would have to pay to acquire such rights.65 For example,
a person would tend to demand more to sell a property or other legal
right that she already owns than she would be willing to pay for the
identical right out of a stock of cash (or other liquid asset). Exactly why
people’s valuations depend on initial endowments is not entirely clear.
Gregory Klass and Kathryn Zeiler explain endowment effects as a
corollary to “loss aversion” — the idea that losses cause more pain than
gains cause pleasure.66 The existence of endowment effects is
somewhat controversial with a few economists,67 but many
63. Foremost are several prior experimental papers on IP law, many of them by Christopher
Buccafusco, Christopher Sprigman, and various coauthors. See infra notes 68, 70, 71, 73.
These experiments aim to figure out how people respond creatively to various types of
incentives, and how they value and trade the IP once it is created.
64. Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An
Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) [hereinafter Valuing Intellectual Property]
(“[N]o study has explored the existence of the endowment effect for property that, like IP, (1)
was actually created by the owners and (2) is nonrival . . . . [W]e present an experiment that
demonstrates a substantial valuation asymmetry. . . . The observed differences . . . indicate
that IP licensing markets may be substantially less efficient than previously believed.”);
Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV.
31, 31 (2011) [hereinafter The Creativity Effect] (“[W]e report on . . . a planned series of
experiments designed to determine whether transactions in intellectual property (IP) are
subject to the valuation anomaly commonly referred to as the ‘endowment effect’ — the
empirical finding that owners of goods tend to value them substantially more than do
purchasers.”).
65. Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227,
1228 (2003) (discussing the endowment effect).
66. Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler, Against Endowment Theory: Experimental
Economics and Legal Scholarship, 61 UCLA L. REV. 2, 4 (2013). But other psychological
explanations might be possible. Thus, one might gain some sentimental attachment to objects,
particularly intimate objects such as wedding rings, clothing, and jewelry, from owning them.
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 32 STAN. L. REV 957, 959 (1982).
67. See, e.g., Klass & Zeiler, supra note 66, at 6; Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The
Willingness to Pay—Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject
Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REV.
530, 531 (2005) (suggesting that experimental subjects’ misconceptions are responsible for
the endowment effect); Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew Spitzer, Willingness-To-Pay vs.
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experiments, including those of Buccafusco and Sprigman, find that
they are real and extend to IP markets.68 Specifically, Buccafusco and
Sprigman find that the endowment effect is large for the rights to a prize
for a winning poem or painting.69 However, these insights — while
interesting and important in their own right — are somewhat tangential
to our inquiry here. First, they test for bids and offers for a prize in a
copyright context, not the decision to invest in an invention. Second,
their endowment effect frame is fundamentally different from (and
independent of) our risk tolerance frame.70
There are a number of other important experimental recent works
on IP. For example, Buccafusco, Burns, Fromer, and Sprigman test the
different incentives provided by copyright and patent on creativity. 71
They have subjects play a game, randomly assigning the scoring
rubrics. Buccafusco et al. argue that the different scoring rubrics are
proxies for the creativity thresholds in patent and copyright, with patent
having a higher bar to score any points, and copyright with a low bar.
Unlike our study, their experiment does not address risk preferences of
inventors or investors. Several prior works have focused on sequential
innovation — the problem of needing to get permission to use prior,
protected works in creating new works. The first was an extremely

Willingness-To-Access: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 59, 59–60
(1993); Jennifer Arlen, Matthew L. Spitzer & Eric L. Talley, Endowment Effects Within
Corporate Agency Relationships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (2002); Jason F. Shogren, Seung Y.
Shin, Dermot J. Hayes & James B. Kliebenstein, Resolving Differences in Willingness to Pay
and Willingness to Accept, 84 AMER. ECON. REV. 255, 256–56 (1994).
68. See Valuing Intellectual Property, supra note 64, at 3–4 (creating an experimental
market for poems modeled after a market for licensing IP and finding a substantial valuation
asymmetry between authors of poems and potential purchasers of them); The Creativity
Effect, supra note 64, at 39 (showing that painters value their paintings more than four times
higher than potential buyers of the paintings did and almost twice as high as did legal owners
of the paintings).
69. The Creativity Effect, supra note 64, at 42.
70. See infra Section II.B. In addition, they do not test for the differences between
laboratory experiments and M-Turk. There is at least one prior work using M-Turk for an IP
experiment. See generally Christopher Buccafusco, Paul J. Heald & Wen Bu, Testing
Tarnishment in Trademark and Copyright Law: The Effect of Pornographic Versions of
Protected Marks and Works, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 341, 341 (2016) (“This Article presents
two novel experimental tests of the tarnishment hypothesis . . . . Our results find little
evidence supporting the tarnishment hypothesis.”). However, we have found no prior work
testing for the difference between a brick-and-mortar laboratory and M-Turk in any IP
experiment.
71. Christopher Buccafusco, Zachary C. Burns, Jeanne C. Fromer & Christopher J.
Sprigman, Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds, 92 TEX.
L. REV. 1921, 1946 (2014). These legal rules can be quite idiosyncratic. For a superb
experimental test of the fairness of the German “Bestseller Paragraph” provision in copyright,
and its effect on the market, see Christoph Engel & Michael Kurschilgen, Fairness Ex Ante
and Ex Post: Experimentally Testing Ex Post Judicial Intervention into Blockbuster Deals, 8
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 682, 699 (2011).
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complicated, multiple stage game.72 Some subsequent experiments
have been less complex and suggest that IP rights in a first invention
hinder sequential innovation.73 Others suggest that a lack of rights in a
first invention, as against sequential invention, discourages the initial
invention.74 Sequential innovation is an interesting yet distinct question
from the research questions we tackle in this article.
In sum, although there are several interesting scholarly
contributions at the intersection of IP and experimental methods, it
appears that none of them directly addresses the issues we attempt to
take on in this paper.
B. Framing Effects
The core focus of our study pertains to whether risk tolerances
appear to interact responsively to contexts “framed” by innovative
activity. Consequently, our arguments intersect in meaningful ways
with the “framing literatures” that permeate much of psychology,
political science, and economics. Within these literatures, as it turns
out, the term “frame” can be used in several different ways. Thus, in
order to identify and situate our contribution, we briefly review below
several competing conceptions of the term, identifying where our
analysis fits in. Readers who are already knowledgeable about the
taxonomy of “framing effects” in economics, psychology, political
science, and sociology literatures may go directly to Section 4 in this
subsection, which identifies the particular type we utilize in our
experiments.

72. See Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts,
10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 130, 142 (2009) (“This Article presents empirical data
generated using PatentSim, — a simulation game designed specifically to test hypotheses
about patent systems, commons systems, and technological innovation.”).
73. See, e.g., Stefan Bechtold, Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman,
Innovation Heuristics: Experiments on Sequential Creativity in Intellectual Property, 91 IND.
L.J. 1251, 1251 (2016) (“We find that subjects are only mildly responsive to external
incentives. Rather, choices between innovation and borrowing correlated much more
powerfully with their internal, subjective beliefs about the difficulty of innovating.”); Julia
Brüggemann, Paolo Crosetto, Lukas Meub & Kilian Bizer, Intellectual Property Rights
Hinder Sequential Innovation — Experimental Evidence, 45 RSCH. POL’Y 2054, 2054 (2016)
(“Our results suggest that granting intellectual property rights hinders innovations, especially
for sectors characterized by a strong sequentiality in innovation processes.”). Note, however,
that Bechtold et. al. obtains results partially inconsistent with inventor rationality. Bechtold,
supra, at 1286.
74. See, e.g., Kevin J. Boudreau & Karim R. Lakhani, “Open” Disclosures of Innovations,
Incentives, and Follow-on Reuse: Theory on Processes of Cumulative Innovation and a Field
Experiment in Computational Biology, 44 RSCH. POL’Y 4, 4 (2015) (“We find intermediate
disclosure has the advantage of efficiently steering development towards improving existing
solution approaches, but also the effect of limiting experimentation and narrowing
technological search.”).
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1. Categorization Schemes
Framing categorization schemes in the political science and
psychology literatures are reasonably well established. For example,
James Druckman contrasts equivalence framing — “the use of
different, but logically equivalent, words or phrases (e.g., 5%
unemployment or 95% employment, 97% fat-free or 3% fat) causes
individuals to alter their preferences” — with emphasis framing effects,
which “caus[e] individuals to focus on certain aspects or
characterizations of an issue or problem instead of others.”75
Priyodorshi Banerjee and Sujoy Chakravarty, on the other hand,
contrast label framing, invoked “if subjects are confronted with
alternative wordings, but objectively equivalent material incentives and
unchanged reference points (with regard to how the endowment is
initially allocated),” with value framing, where “subjects are
confronted with alternative wordings and objectively equivalent
material incentives but changed reference points.”76 Irwin Levin,
Sandra Schneider, and Gary Gaeth contrast risky choice framing
(similar to value framing) with attribute framing, where “people are
more likely to evaluate a gamble favorably when it is described
positively in terms of winning rather than when it is described
negatively in terms of losing,” and goal framing, which describes “the
goal of an action or behavior.”77 None of these categorizations is
directly analogous to our inquiry here.
2. Light Computation
In other literatures, framing tends to place subjects in a situation
that requires light computation to understand the choices they confront.
These framing studies include the “reference point” studies for which
Kahneman and Tversky are most famous.78 This category also includes
circumstances where frames induce asymmetric errors in understanding
games.79 There are additionally experiments that use compound
75. James N. Druckman, The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence, 23
POL. BEHAV. 225, 228, 230 (2001).
76. Priyodorshi Banerjee & Sujoy Chakravarty, The Effect of Minimal Group Framing in
a Dictator Game Experiment 5 (June 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2071006 [https://perma.cc/D3TD-AZZE]).
77. Irwin P. Levin, Sandra L. Schneider & Gary J. Gaeth, All Frames Not Created Equal:
A Typology and Critical Analysis of Framing Effects, 76 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 149, 150, 159–60 (1998).
78. See Tversky& Kahneman., supra note 15, at 456.
79. See Toke Reinholt Fosgaard, Lars Gårn Hansen & Erik Wengström, Framing and
Misperception in Public Good Experiments, 119 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 435, 440 (2016).
Fosgaard et al. ran a public goods game in two different frames. After the game was over, the
authors asked the subjects which set of strategies would have maximized their own payoffs,
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lotteries.80 For example, Mohammed Abdellaoui, Peter Klibanoff, and
Laetitia Placido measured compound risk and found that subjects
valued compound risks differently than simple risks and that the risk
attitudes displayed “more [risk] aversion as the reduced probability of
the winning event increases.”81 Also worthy of note here is a fascinating
recent paper by Richard Brooks, Alexander Stremitzer, and Stephan
Tontrup, which studies the effort participants exerted when they entered
into a contract and completed economic tests for compensation.82 The
authors determined that thresholds and framing affect effort, noting
particularly that loss framing with “poorly selected thresholds may
reduce effort.”83 These versions of light computation frames have
features that are shared with the type of frame we study here.
3. Emphasis and Priming
There are also frames that tend to emphasize some aspect of a given
choice, casting one (or more) option in a negative or positive light. An
excellent example comes from Dennis Chong and James Druckman,
discussing a study by Paul Sniderman and Sean Theriault:
What is particularly vexing in public opinion research
is a phenomenon known as “framing effects.” These
occur when (often small) changes in the presentation
of an issue or an event produce (sometimes large)
changes of opinion. For example, when asked whether
they would favor or oppose allowing a hate group to
hold a political rally, 85% of respondents answered in
favor if the question was prefaced with the suggestion,
“Given the importance of free speech,” whereas only

and which set of strategies would have maximized the payoff to other group members. When
a subject was unable to answer these questions correctly, the authors coded that as an error.
Fosgaard et al. found that one of the frames induced far more errors than did the other frame,
even though the underlying tasks and choices were identical. Id. at 437, 449.
80. A simple lottery has the general form 𝑝𝐴 + (1 − 𝑝), where p is a probability between
0 and 1, and A and B are outcomes. A two-element compound lottery has the general form
𝑟[𝑝𝐴 + (1 − 𝑝)𝐵] + (1 − 𝑟)[𝑞𝐶 + (1 − 𝑞)𝐷], where p, q, and r are all probabilities, and A,
B, C, and D are outcomes.
81. Mohammed Abdellaoui, Peter Klibanoff & Laetitia Placido, Experiments on
Compound Risk in Relation to Simple Risk and to Ambiguity, 61 MGMT. SCI. 1306, 1306
(2015).
82. Richard R. W. Brooks, Alexander Stremitzer & Stephan Tontrup, Stretch It but Don’t
Break It: The Hidden Cost of Contract Framing, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 402 (2017).
83. Id. at 399.

210

Harvard Journal of Law & Technology

[Vol. 34

45% were in favor when the question was prefaced
with the phrase, “Given the risk of violence.”84
In this sort of frame, there is no real difficulty or mental
computation required in understanding the basic choice of allowing a
hate group to hold a rally or not. The frame, instead, prompts the subject
to concentrate on either a positive aspect (the value of free speech) or a
negative aspect (the risk of violence) inherent in the choice. Emphasis
frames seem very close to priming in psychology — an approach that
gives subjects some information that triggers a particular emotional
reaction, or which focuses attention on some aspect of the experiment.85
Thus, a recent article “primes” experimental subjects (all of whom were
financial professionals) with either a boom or a bust scenario.86 Those
who were primed with a bust scenario became more risk-averse.87 But
one could just as easily say that the subjects were in a bust frame, where
the frame is an emphasis frame.88 Priming, rather than framing, tends
to be used in experiments involving financial decision-making and risk

84. Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Framing Theory, 10 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 103,
104 (2007) (citing Paul M. Sniderman & Sean M. Theriault, The Structure of Political
Argument and the Logic of Issue Framing, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC OPINION: ATTITUDES,
NONATTITUDES, MEASUREMENT ERROR, AND CHANGE 132, 151–52 (Willem E. Saris & Paul
M. Sniderman eds., 2018)).
85. See John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Mind in the Middle: A Practical Guide
to Priming and Automaticity Research, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL
AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 253, 255 (Harry T. Reis & Charles M. Judd eds., 2000)
(providing a guide to various priming methods used across psychological fields); Els C. M.
Van Schie & Joop Van Der Pligt, Influencing Risk Preference in Decision Making: The
Effects of Framing and Salience, 63 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 264, 265 (1995) (discussing the relevance of salience, which may be produced by
priming).
86. Alain Cohn, Jan Engelmann, Ernst Fehr & Michel André Maréchal, Evidence for
Countercyclical Risk Aversion: An Experiment with Financial Professionals, 105 AM. ECON.
REV. 860, 861–62 (2015). For a similar boom/bust priming experiment with M-Turk subjects,
see Jae Hyoung Kim & Elizabeth Hoffman, Contrast Effects in Investment and Financing
Decisions 7–9 (Oct. 19, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3256087 [https://perma.cc/2Y8U-HW5J]) (finding that
contrast effects altered investment decisions, but not financing decisions, and hypothesizing
that the fact that subjects took significantly more time making financing decisions than
investment decisions suggests that financing decisions required more careful thought and
triggered “slow” thinking, as described by Daniel Kahneman, see generally DANIEL
KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011)).
87. Cohn et al., supra note 86, at 861–62.
88. Similarly, Ellingsen et al. found that situational labels significantly affect behavior.
They framed a prisoner’s dilemma as a “community game” or a “stock market game,” and
found that subjects were more cooperative when framed as a “community game.” Tore
Ellingsen, Magnus Johannesson, Johanna Mollerstrom & Sara Munkhammar, Social Framing
Effects: Preferences or Beliefs?, 76 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 117, 124 (2012). Further, Tyran
and Feld found that expectations of cooperation amongst others lead to an increase in
cooperation with non-deterrent sanction laws. Jean-Robert Tyran & Lars P. Feld, Achieving
Compliance when Legal Sanctions Are Non-Deterrent, 108 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 135, 153
(2006).
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acceptance.89 Again, this approach does not seem to square with the
frame in our paper.
4. Imagine Yourself in a Context
Finally, “Imagine Yourself in a Context” frames can be found in
experiments that either tell subjects that they are in a particular setting,
or ask the subjects to imagine themselves in a particular setting when
making choices. These experiments often involve risky choices,
particularly those experiments looking for the source of differences
between men’s and women’s attitudes towards risk.90 In these frames,
the subjects are prompted to imagine themselves in a casino, or imagine
themselves buying insurance, or imagine themselves making an
investment. In some of these papers, the context, interacted with
gender, produces a change in risk aversion.91 For example, Renate
89. See, e.g., Hans-Peter Erb, Antoine Bioy & Denis J. Hilton, Choice Preferences Without
Inferences: Subconscious Priming of Risk Attitudes, 15 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 251,
253 (2002); Katja Meier-Pesti & Elfriede Penz, Sex or Gender? Expanding the Sex-Based
View by Introducing Masculinity and Femininity as Predictors of Financial Risk Taking, 29.
J. ECON. PSYCH. 180, 188–89 (2008). For a highly imaginative connection of priming and
memory, see Petko Kusev, Paul van Schaik & Silvio Aldrovandi, Preferences Induced by
Accessibility: Evidence from Priming, 5 J. NEUROSCIENCE PSYCHOL. & ECON. 250 (2012).
90. See, e.g., Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, Forecasting Risk Attitudes: An
Experimental Study Using Actual and Forecast Gamble Choices, 68 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
1, 1 (2008) (“We find that women are significantly more risk averse than men . . . and
predictions of both women and men tend to confirm this difference.”); Renate Schubert,
Martin Brown, Matthias Gysler & Hans Wolfgang Brachinger, Financial Decision-Making:
Are Women Really More Risk-Averse?, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 381, 382–83 (1999) (describing
experiments designed to test how men and women react differently when confronted with
risky financial decisions); Helga Fehr-Duda, Manuele de Gennaro & Renate Schubert,
Gender, Financial Risk, and Probability Weights, 60 THEORY & DECISION 283, 286 (2006);
Sebastian Lotz, Is Women’s Behavior More Context-Dependent than Men’s? Gender
Differences in Reluctant Altruism 1 (December 19, 2014) (unpublished manuscript)
(available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2540050 [https://perma.cc/G9RE-GHM9]); Gary
Charness & Uri Gneezy, Strong Evidence for Gender Differences in Risk Taking, 83 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 50, 55 (2012).
91. The study conducted by Schubert et al. found that “female subjects do not generally
make less risky financial choices than male subjects.” Schubert et al., supra note 90, at 384.
However, the female subjects had different reactions to risk than male subjects in abstract
gambling situations. Id. Additionally, Lotz found “considerable gender differences between
women and men that depended on the context of the game.” Lotz, supra note 90, at 4. When
the game demanded more giving, women displayed more generosity, while the “men’s
behavior is not context-dependent.” Id. at 1. Croson et al. observed differences in risk and
social and competitive preferences and noted that emotions, overconfidence and framing
could be the cause behind sex differences. Rachel Croson & Uri Gneezy, Gender Differences
in Preferences, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 448, 452–54 (2009). Additionally, Charness and
Gneezy directly found that women are less likely to invest. Charness et al., supra note 90, at
57. When Eckel and Grossman conducted research in gambling games with three framings,
they found that women were more risk-averse even with an investment frame with no losses.
Eckel et al., supra note 90, at 1. In contrast, Nelson reviewed thirty-five empirical works that
studied sex-based risk aversion and determined that in many cases, the difference between
men and women lacked statistical significance. Julie A. Nelson, Are Women Really More
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Schubert and coauthors gave subjects a choice between a lottery and a
certain amount of money.92 First, subjects were given a plain,
unadorned choice, with no context. Then, later in the experiment,
subjects were offered the same choice, but within an “investment”
context. In the unadorned choice, women exhibited more risk aversion
than did men. But when the choice was embedded in an investment
context, women and men revealed the same levels of risk aversion.93
Although such a result is quite striking, the exact mechanism is unclear.
It could be that subjects have different utility functions in different
contexts, or perceive probabilities differently in different contexts (e.g.,
casino vs. insurance) or it could be that the frames prime different
emotions that in turn change behavior.94 This context is, in essence, the
nature of the frame we employ below.

III. DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIMENT
Having reviewed the general literature on intellectual property, risk
tolerance and framing effects, we are now in a position to explain the
details of our experimental design.

1. Experimental 2x2 Design
As noted in the Introduction, the central question we explore in this
article is whether people manifest different risk tolerances when an
otherwise risky choice is framed in terms of an innovation-related
investment. Thus, a key feature of our experiment is to confront
subjects with a choice between (1) a safe option and (2) a risky option;
and then to manipulate that choice to be framed in (i) an innovationframed context or (ii) a non-framed context. Our baseline experiments,
then — as well as our robustness tests — navigate variants of the basic
design illustrated in Table 1:

Risk-Averse Than Men? A Re-Analysis of the Literature Using Expanded Methods, 29 J.
ECON. SURVS. 566, 580 (2015).
92. Schubert et al., supra note 90, at 383–84.
93. Id. at 384.
94. Emotions such as fear can alter risk decisions; Lee and Andrade studied the effect fear
plays on risk taking. Chan J. Lee & Eduardo B. Andrade, Fear, Excitement, and Financial
Risk-Taking, 29 COGNITION & EMOTION 178, 178 (2014). They induced fear by having
subjects watch two horror movie clips and observed that fear-induced subjects were more
risk-averse when the risk was framed as a stock market game. Id. However, they found that
risk taking increased when framed as an “exciting casino game.” Id.
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Table 1: 2x2 Setup for Experimental Design

(I) Innovation-Related Frame
(ii) No Frame

(1) Safe
Option
I
III

(2) Risky
Option
II
IV

Consider first the choice presented to subjects in the innovationrelated frame (cells I and II in the top row of Table 1, which we refer
to in what follows as our “Invest in Invention” treatment group).
Subjects in this frame were given the following prompt:
Before filling out a brief questionnaire, you will be
given $8 either to Keep or to Invest in creating a
hypothetical invention . . . . If you choose to Keep,
your earnings will be $8. If you choose to Invest there
is a 1/3 chance that the creative and
commercialization process will be successful and
return $30, and a 2/3 chance that it will be
unsuccessful in the market and return $3. A role of a
die will determine your earnings, either $30 or $3.
Now consider the choice presented to subjects in the noninnovation frame (cells III and IV in the bottom row of Table 1, or the
“Simple Lottery” control group). Subjects in this frame were given the
following prompt:
Before filling out a brief questionnaire, you will be
asked to make a choice between Option A and Option
B. You will have only a single opportunity to choose.
After you have made your choice, if you chose Option
A, your earnings will be $8. If you chose Option B,
there is a 1/3 chance that your earnings will be $30,
and a 2/3 chance that your earnings will be $3. A role
of a die will determine your earnings, either $30 or $3.
Note that the Simple Lottery frame and the Invest in Invention
frame describe economically identical risk-reward choices. The key
difference is the way the choices are framed.95
95. The attentive reader will notice that the Invest in Invention frame initially endows the
subject with cash and asks whether she wants to invest it in the risky option, while the Simple
Lottery setup does not endow the subject with anything and asks her to choose between safe
and risky options. Consequently, one might be concerned that this phrasing inadvertently
introduces a type of “endowment effect” in the innovation frame. We address this issue below.
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In passing, it is worth observing that the first setup above is closest
to the “Imagine Yourself in a Context” version of framing discussed
above, albeit incentivized with real economic stakes. In the Invest in
Invention frame, we inform subjects that they have the opportunity to
invest in a “hypothetical invention.” The payoffs correspond to whether
or not the invention succeeds and is a success in the market. Beyond
the (accurate) financial rewards, clearly none of this is literally true.
Rather, by being prompted that this is a hypothetical invention, the
subjects are being asked to imagine that it is true, and act accordingly
(incentivized by monetary rewards). We used the adjective
“hypothetical” to describe the invention to reduce the chance that
subjects felt that the invention was exciting or prosocial. We believe
that labeling it as a hypothetical invention should moderate the effect
of the word “invention” on subjects, likely rendering conservative
estimates of the true effects of “invention.”96 Significantly, the two
choices are stated in absolutely identical terms. And, just as in the other
papers that use this frame, we assume that the subjects are imagining in
precisely the way that we ask of them.
Notice also that the experiment uses a simple, binary choice
between a safe option and a risky option. We chose this design
deliberately, for two reasons. First, anticipating that we would be
running our experiment on M-Turk, and knowing that M-Turk subjects
often present a different profile from brick-and-mortar subjects in the
lab,97 we wanted to keep the choice simple and intuitive.98 Second, we
See infra Section V.A.2. But to cut to the chase, it does not appear that this concern has much
of an impact on our results. First, there are a priori reasons to doubt the endowment effect
plays much of a role in this context, since it is known to dissipate when the initial
“endowment” consists of cash or liquid assets (as does ours). But even if our innovation frame
introduced an endowment effect, we would predict it would cut in the direction of making our
subjects in that frame overly reluctant to part with their safe endowment for the risky choice.
(As we show, the strong tendency of our subjects is to do the opposite.) But in any event, we
also explore a variation on our experiment where the treatment retains the endowment feature
but strips out all investment and innovation framing. There, our measured effect largely
disappears. See infra Section V.A.1.
96. Our frame is also tangentially related to a light computation frame, similar to the
reference point frame used by Kahneman and Tversky. See Tversky et al., supra note 15, at
456.
97. See Gabriele Paolacci & Jesse Chandler, Inside the Turk: Understanding Mechanical
Turk as a Participant Pool, 23 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 184, 185 (2014) (finding
that M-Turkers averaged 30 years of age, tending to be younger than the general population).
Lab subjects in our experiment average just over 20 years of age.
98. See Chetan Dave, Catherine Eckel, Cathleen Johnson & Christian Rojas, Eliciting Risk
Preferences: When Is Simple Better?, 41 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 219, 219 (2010) (“We
analyze how and when a simpler, but coarser, elicitation method may be preferred to the more
complex, but finer, one. . . . [T]he simpler task may be preferred for subjects who exhibit low
numeracy, as it generates less noisy behavior but similar predictive accuracy.”). An
alternative would have been to use something like the choice used by Gneezy and Potters. Uri
Gneezy & Jan Potters, An Experiment on Risk Taking and Evaluation Periods, 112 Q.J. ECON.
631, 634 (1997). Each subject was given 200 units (convertible to cash at the end of the
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used the simple, binary choice because it captures some of the features
of the external world in ways that more complex and nuanced choices
do not. When someone is asking herself, “Should I invest this money
or keep it?”, she is far more likely to approach this question as binary,
at least as a first step. And there are many situations, possibly as a result
of mental accounting,99 where binary choices seem pervasive. None of
this is to say that a more complex, continuous-choice approach is not
also relevant to understanding behavior. If one were trying to model
someone who is deciding on a large number of investments as a
portfolio, a different approach would be needed.100
2. Demographic Variables and Baseline Risk Aversion
In addition to making the choices described above, each subject
additionally answered a series of demographic questions (related to
age, gender, education, and the like) as well as a well-known risk
aversion scale101 that delivers a quantitative reflection of risk aversion
for each subject.
The risk aversion diagnostic we employ is often known in the
economics literature as the Holt-Laury (or HL) measure. The HL
measure for risk aversion asks a subject to make a choice — Option A
(a low variance gamble) or Option B (a high variance gamble) — across
experiment), and then offered the choice to allocate X, where 0 ≤ X ≤ 200, to the following
gamble: a 2/3 chance of losing the amount of her “bet,” X; and a 1/3 chance of winning 2.5
times X. Id. If the subject allocated less than 200 to the gamble, she received 200 – X with
certainty, plus the outcome of the gamble. Id. For highly numerate subjects, such an approach
might provide more fine-grained information on attitudes towards risk. However, this choice
is somewhat complicated, and with our M-Turk subjects, we feared generating a great deal of
noise.
99. See Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING
183, 183 (1999) (“Mental accounting is the set of cognitive operations used by individuals
and households to organize, evaluate, and keep track of financial activities.”); see also
Thomas Langer & Martin Weber, Prospect Theory, Mental Accounting, and Differences in
Aggregated and Segregated Evaluation of Lottery Portfolios, 47 MGMT. SCI. 716, 717 (2001)
(reviewing literature suggesting that isolated evaluation frames may affect manifest
preferences).
100. Jae Hyoung Kim and Elizabeth Hoffman examine the effect that prior good or bad
news has on portfolio choices. Kim et al., supra note 86.
101. See Holt et al., supra note 14. We could have used the simpler Eckel and Grossman
risk aversion test. Eckel et al., supra note 90, at 2. However, as Eckel and Grossman said
themselves of Holt and Laury, “This mechanism imposes a finer grid on the subjects’
decisions, and thus produces a more refined estimate of the relevant utility function
parameters. However, this comes at a cost of increased complexity, which may lead to errors.”
Id. Others add: “The prevalent use of the Holt-Laury measure has allowed researchers to
compare risk attitudes across a wide array of contexts and environments. In turn, this has
facilitated a less fragmented approach to the study of risk preferences that minimizes
methodological differences and aims to characterize a more general phenomenon.” Gary
Charness, Uri Gneezy & Alex Imas, Experimental Methods: Eliciting Risk Preference, 87 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 43, 46 (2013). Since we wanted to estimate a risk aversion parameter,
we made the decision to use Holt and Laury, despite the increased complexity.
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a grid of decisions that have progressively different risk characteristics
corresponding to each succeeding row of Table 2. Typically, subjects’
preferred option will switch from Option A to Option B at some row in
the table, and then stay there for the remaining rows. It is important to
note that asking subjects to choose between Option A and Option B
from each row is the only instruction given to subjects. They do not
even see the “Low Variation” and “High Variation” descriptors and we
suggest no order for their answers.102
Table 2: Holt-Laury Risk Aversion Index

Row 1
Row 2
Row 3
Row 4
Row 5
Row 6

Option A (Low
Variation)

Option B (High
Variation)

10% chance of $2.00 and
90% chance of $1.60
20% chance of $2.00 and
80% chance of $1.60
30% chance of $2.00 and
70% chance of $1.60
40% chance of $2.00 and
60% chance of $1.60
50% chance of $2.00 and
50% chance of $1.60
60% chance of $2.00 and
40% chance of $1.60

10% chance of $3.85 and
90% chance of $0.10
20% chance of $3.85 and
80% chance of $0.10
30% chance of $3.85 and
70% chance of $0.10
40% chance of $3.85 and
60% chance of $0.10
50% chance of $3.85 and
50% chance of $0.10
60% chance of $3.85 and
40% chance of $0.10

102. Subjects do not get any further instructions. But, for readers unfamiliar with HL,
Table 2 is perhaps best understood by starting at the bottom row (Row 10). Neither Option A
nor Option B has any risk whatsoever. Option A gives the subject $2.00 with certainty, while
Option B gives the subject $3.85 with certainty. Any subject who prefers more money to
less — a fundamental assumption about subjects in economics experiments — should choose
Option B. Now consider the options provided in Row 9. By choosing Option A the subject
has a 90% chance of getting $2.00 and only a 10% chance of getting $1.60, with an expected
value of $1.96 = (0.90×($2.00)+0.10×($1.60)). Option B, on the other hand, gives the subject
a 90% chance at $3.85, which is (still) much more than $2.00. However, Option B also
introduces a 10% chance of getting a relatively unattractive downside of $0.10. Here, Option
B has an expected value of $3.475, which is still much more than $1.96, but it now involves
some downside risk. Is it rational to choose Option A in this circumstance? It could be, for
someone who was very fearful of the 10% chance of $0.10 and was willing to trade almost
half of Option B’s expected value to escape that risk. We call such a person highly risk-averse.
As one proceeds up the chart, from Row 10 (where everyone should choose Option B), to
Row 1, each subject will eventually switch from Option B to Option A. Once the subject has
switched from Option B to Option A, she should not (as a matter of theory) switch back. The
unique row on the chart where the subject switches gives us a scaled measure of how riskaverse or risk-seeking that subject is. To be more precise, from the switching point one can
compute upper and lower bounds of the subject’s tolerance for risk, defined by the rows above
and below the point of switching. The implications of these bounds is explored more fully
below and in the Appendix. The key principle is that one can use these estimates of risk
aversion as controls for the underlying general risk tolerances of each subject in our
experiment. For more detailed discussion, see infra Appendix A.
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70% chance of $2.00 and
30% chance of $1.60
80% chance of $2.00 and
20% chance of $1.60
90% chance of $2.00 and
10% chance of $1.60
100% chance of $2.00 and
0% chance of $1.60
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70% chance of $3.85 and
30% chance of $0.10
80% chance of $3.85 and
20% chance of $0.10
90% chance of $3.85 and
10% chance of $0.10
100% chance of $3.85 and
0% chance of $0.10

3. Subject Pool, Recruitment and Compensation
Our data come from multiple waves of subjects, recruited across
different platforms. We first conducted a series of the above
experiments in the lab at Iowa State University, using students as
subjects. The responses of these subjects were collected on a paper
form, and the roll of a die determined the payoff for those subjects who
chose the risky option. In this wave (and all the others), subjects were
randomly assigned to either the Invest in Invention frame treatment
group or the Simple Lottery frame control group, and the order of
presentation of the certain and the risky options was randomly
presented as either the first or the second option.
We then migrated our experiments to the M-Turk platform, using
a Qualtrics format to collect the data and roll a simulated, electronic
die. M-Turk subjects were paid in experimental dollars that converted
to one-fourth of the lab payoffs.
Finally, we replicated the experiments using a Qualtrics survey
emailed to college students and conducted entirely online. Subjects
chose to be paid by Amazon gift card, PayPal, or a check. The payoffs
were expressed in experimental dollars that converted to one-half of the
lab payoffs.103
In addition to our baseline condition, we stress tested our results
with a variety of robustness checks. Of particular note, we confronted

103. We paid the M-Turk subjects about the same as they could earn in other M-Turk tasks.
In contrast, we paid the subjects in the brick-and-mortar lab more because they had to spend
much more time, including getting to and from the lab, to do the experiment. Also, they could
not take the experiment at their convenience. Thus, the brick-and-mortar lab subjects had a
much higher cost of participating in the experiment than did the M-Turk subjects. We paid
the Qualtrics at Iowa State subjects an intermediate amount, representing a notion that
although they could take the experiment at their convenience, they had many demands on
their time, most prominently homework. Thus, we were attempting to compete with the
opportunity costs of their time. We do not believe that the different levels of payment in the
different contexts changed the results. See John Gibson & David Johnson, The Economic
Relevancy of Risk Preferences Elicited Online and with Low Stakes 1 (June 8, 2018)
(unpublished
manuscript)
(available
at
https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/87231/1/MPRA_paper_87231.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QFY-7AVF]) (finding
that preferences are preserved online and with small stakes when compared to other published
experimental results).
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a select subset of our subjects (drawn from the M-Turk and online
experiments) with a slightly varied vignette in which downside risk also
presented the possibility of negative payoffs. For the negative-payoff
conditions, Option A or Keep provided earnings of [$8],104 just as in the
baseline. But for Option B or Invest in Invention, we informed subjects
that “there is a 1/3 chance that your earnings will be [$42], and a 2/3
chance that your earnings will be [-$3] . . . . These earnings or losses
will be added to or subtracted from your [$5] participation fee.”
In two additional robustness checks, we reran versions of the
baseline experiments with slightly modified frames, both of which
reverted to the baseline “can’t lose money” setup. In the “Invest Only”
version, the risky choice was framed without language referring to a
“hypothetical invention.” In the “Endow Only” version, the risky
choice was framed in a manner that addresses possibilities of
endowment effects in our baseline experiments. (Both robustness tests
are described in greater detail in the next Part of this article.)
In all, we report on experiments with 1,159 subjects, drawn from
laboratory, M-Turk and Qualtrics online student populations. For each
group, subjects were then randomly assigned to treatment and control
arms as listed in Table 3.
Table 3: Distribution of Subjects by Population and Version

Baseline Treatment
Group – Can’t Lose
$
Baseline Control
Group – Can’t Lose
$
Baseline Treatment
Group – Can Lose $
Baseline Control
Group – Can Lose $
Robustness
Treatment Group –
Invest Only
Robustness Control
Group – Invest Only

Laboratory

Mechanical
Turk

Qualtrics
Online

51

101

59

49

92

60

0

102

78

0

100

80

0

94

0

0

90

0

104. As described above, in the Qualtrics online surveys shown to M-Turker and Iowa
State students, we converted the dollars to experimental dollars. In those experiments, we
used a mythical monetary symbol ₳ to refer to the payouts to avoid confusing subjects. (We
provided subjects with information that would allow them to make appropriate monetary
conversions.)
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Robustness
Treatment Group –
Endow Only
Robustness Control
Group – Endow
Only
Subtotals
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0

102

0

0

100

0

100

781

277

We also collected a variety of demographic control variables for
each subject, as specified in Table 4.105
Table 4: List of variables and descriptions
Collected Variables
Age
Gender
Hand
Ethnicity
Gambled

Description
Subject’s age
Dummy = 1 if subject is male
Dummy = 1 if subject is left-handed
Dummy = 1 if subject is non-white
Dummy = 1 if subject has gambled for fun
before

Figure 1 describes the breakdown of these various demographic
variables (as well as the proportional representation of M-Turkers in
our subject pool).

105. We collected gender because there is a literature on whether men’s and women’s risk
preferences differ, and whether the preferences differ by frame. See supra notes 90–91. We
collected the other data on the same theory — that maybe these characteristics would
independently affect risk preferences, as well as preferences towards investing.
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Figure 1: Breakdown of subjects by several demographic variables
Finally, as noted above, we elicited from each subject a Holt-Laury
“score” (“HL score”) by presenting them a version of Table 2, and
recording the first row at which the subject switched away from
preferring the low-variability Option A, and into the high-variability
Option B. The distribution of switching points (as a proportion of the
entire population of subjects) is depicted in Figure 2. Overall, the
median switching point was at Row 7, with a mean of 6.43 and a
standard deviation of 2.23. Note from the figure that just under 6% of
our subjects appear to manifest significant risk tolerance, opting for
Option B out of the gate, in the first row of Table 2. In addition, note
that 3.86% of our subjects favor Option A across all rows — a behavior
that seems abnormal once Row 10 is reached (since there is no risk in
Row 10 and Option B dominates). For the sake of transparency, we
retain these subjects for our results reported below, but we have
confirmed that their exclusion does not materially change our results.106

106. For computing means and medians, we treat the modest number of “Always A”
subjects as an 11 in our distribution scale. Excluding them entirely does not affect medians,
and changes the mean and standard deviation only modestly.
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Figure 2: H-L Scores (first row where subject opted for Option B over
Option A)

IV. RESULTS
Our primary results are shown in Figure 3, which illustrates the rate
at which subjects opted for the “safe” choice depending on the frame
presented to them. The left panel (3A) depicts the results of our largest,
“baseline” experiment (“Invest in Invention Frame (Can’t Lose
Money)”), which tracks the exact wording of the hypotheticals as
presented at the beginning of Part II. The right panel (3B) represents
the results from the version of the experiment where it was possible to
lose money with the risky choice (“Invest in Invention Frame (Can
Lose Money)”). As is clear from the Figure, subjects in the experiment
where losing money was possible (3B) opted for safety more frequently
than when they could not lose money (3A). This effect alone should not
be surprising (since frame 3B both introduces negative payoffs and
increases the variance of the gamble represented by the risky option).
More provocative, however, is the effect of the randomized framing
treatment on both groups. In the “Can’t Lose Money” subjects, framing
the risky choice as an investment in innovation caused them to move
from slightly preferring the risky option (56% to 44%) to strongly
preferring the risky option (66% to 33%). The same inclination held in
the right panel, and indeed the framing even caused subjects to “flip”
from disfavoring the risky option (47% to 53%) to favoring it (56% to
44%).
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Figure 3: Percentage of subjects choosing each option by frame
The striking effect depicted above of the invention frame on
manifest risk tolerance is statistically significant at conventional levels.
The left panel (Panel 3A) depicts our baseline manipulation, where the
risky choice did not entail the possibility of losing money. Here, the
Invest in Invention frame caused the treatment group to opt for the risky
choice at a nearly 2-to-1 ratio, even though they were more evenly split
in the control group setting. The difference in risk-taking proclivity
between the treatment and control groups was 11.1%, which was
statistically significant at conventional levels.
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Even when we situate our subjects in a setting where they can lose
money (Panel 3B), the effect of the frame persists (in only slightly
weaker form). Here, control-group subjects actually tended to prefer
the safe option — an observation that is not surprising given the
possibility of losing money and the wider variability of the risky choice.
But introducing the frame flipped this proclivity, causing more subjects
now to favor the risky choice. The difference between treatment and
control groups here was smaller — just under 9% — and its statistical
significance was slightly reduced. But the effect still appears to be
discernible.
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Table 6: Baseline Experiments — Losing Money Not Possible OLS
Estimation

INVENTION
FRAME

MODEL
1
-0.111*

MODEL
2
0.134***

(-2.32)

(-3.00)

GAMBLED

MODEL
3
0.134***
(-3.00)

MODEL
4
0.121***
(-2.73)

MODEL
5
-0.134*

MODEL
6
-0.134**

(-2.34)

(-2.34)

0.021

-0.014

-0.037

-0.035

(0.44)

(-0.28)

(-0.75)

(-0.71)

AGE

MALE

HAND

ETHNICITY

0.009***

0.002

0.001

(3.62)

(0.53)

(0.29)

-0.018

-0.048

-0.001

(-0.41)

(-1.06)

(-0.02)

-0.017

-0.017

-0.017

(-0.30)

(-0.30)

(-0.29)

0.064

0.05

0.045

(1.15)

(0.90)

(0.82)

0.220*

0.297***

(2.33)

(2.65)

TURK

MALE X
TURK
CONSTANT

-0.11
(-1.21)
0.443***

0.580***

0.563***

0.328+

0.441***

0.437***

(12.61)

(3.74)

(3.53)

(1.95)

(2.79)

(2.77)

R-SQD

0.013

0.183

0.183

0.212

0.23

0.233

P

0.020

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

N

412

412

412

412

412

412

HL SWITCH
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
FE
T-Statistics In Parentheses:
+ = Significant At 5% (One Tailed Test); 10% (Two Tailed Test)
* = Significant At 2.5% (One Tailed Test); 5% (Two Tailed Test)
** = Significant At 1% (One Tailed Test); 2% (Two Tailed Test)
*** = Significant At 0.5% (One Tailed Test); 1% (Two Tailed Test)

Yes

Tables 6 and 7 drill a little deeper into our results, reporting on
ordinary least squares estimates of both (a) our baseline specification
where subjects could never lose money from opting for the risky choice
(Table 6); and (b) the specification that includes the robustness test
where negative payoffs are possible (Table 7). In addition to our
control/treatment assignment (which was random, and should be
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sufficient alone)107 these Tables also control for a variety of
demographic variables (such as age, gender, left-handedness, ethnicity)
and some behavioral answers to a variety of questions related to risk
aversion (such as whether the subject has gambled, and a fixed effect
for the HL “row” where the subject switches from low variability to
high variability choice).108 Our Tables also control for whether the
subject was part of our M-Turk population.
The key coefficient of interest for each model in the Tables is the
first line, which reports the probability difference between the
treatment and control groups in choosing the “safe” over the “risky”
option. (Thus, a negative coefficient indicates that the subjects are more
likely to choose the risky option.) The different columns of the Tables
reflect alternative specifications of our estimated model, where we
include additional statistical controls (such as demographic variables
and HL scores). As we can see across Table 6, the innovation frame
induces between 11% and 13.4% lower probability of opting for the
safe option, regardless of other variables we control for (including
baseline measured risk aversion). Moreover, it does not appear that
introducing the prospect of losing money materially undermines the
estimated effect (though it does slightly reduce it). Note from the
subsequent Table 7 that the estimated coefficient of interest now ranges
between 9% and 11.5%, but it remains statistically significant by
conventional measures.

107. Since we randomized assignment of treatment and control, it is not strictly necessary
to control for other variables. We do so anyway, however, to underscore the effect, and
because we have information on risk preferences.
108. See supra Table 1. Our regression specifications use a fixed effect to capture the HL
score rather than using the score as a standard control variable. This choice is deliberate, since
our HL score can only capture an ordering, and thus the numerical values of it do not reflect
evenly-spaced intensities of risk preferences. A fixed-effect approach allows for each HL
“bin” to have an independently estimated effect.
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Table 7: Baseline Experiments — Can Lose Money OLS Estimation

INVENTION
FRAME

MODEL
1
-0.089+

MODEL
2
-0.103*

MODEL
3
-0.102+

MODEL
4
-0.105*

MODEL
5
-0.112*

MODEL
6
-0.114*

(-1.70)

(-1.98)

(-1.95)

(-1.98)

(-2.08)

(-2.12)

GAMBLED

-0.04

-0.038

-0.031

-0.035

(-0.74)

(-0.65)

(-0.54)

(-0.60)

AGE

GENDER

HAND

ETHNICITY

0.001

0.003

0.003

(0.31)

(0.89)

(0.73)

-0.034

-0.02

0.021

(-0.60)

(-0.35)

(0.25)

-0.011

-0.016

-0.014

(-0.09)

(-0.14)

(-0.12)

-0.006

0.009

0.006

(-0.08)

(0.12)

(0.08)

-0.076

-0.021

(-0.91)

(-0.19)

TURK

MALE X
TURK
CONSTANT

-0.079
(-0.70)
0.533***

0.710***

0.743***

0.733***

0.705***

0.700***

(14.44)

(4.90)

(4.84)

(4.18)

(3.96)

(3.93)

R-SQD

0.008

0.073

0.074

0.076

0.078

0.079

P

0.090

0.003

0.003

0.019

0.024

0.029

N

360

360

360

360

360

360

HL SWITCH
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
FE
T-Statistics In Parentheses
+ = Significant At 5% (One Tailed Test); 10% (Two Tailed Test)
* = Significant At 2.5% (One Tailed Test); 5% (Two Tailed Test)
** = Significant At 1% (One Tailed Test); 2% (Two Tailed Test)
*** = Significant At 0.5% (One Tailed Test); 1% (Two Tailed Test)

Yes

The growth in the estimated coefficient of interest that emerges in
Models 2–6 once we control for underlying risk aversion (captured by
HL score) might seem odd initially, but it is an artifact of the
heterogeneity of the underlying risk tolerances of our subject pool,
which adds noise to our estimates. As illustrated above in Figure 2,
some of our subjects start out as extremely risk-seeking (low HL
scores) or extremely risk-averse (high HL scores). When one controls
for their baseline risk aversion (which we elicited independently), the
remaining estimated effect is better able to capture the effect of the
frame. In fact, in Appendix B, we present alternative specifications that
show the same effects in a set of slightly more nuanced “discrete
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choice” frameworks.109 From those models, our estimates (when
projected onto a subject at median HL risk aversion score) imply
between a 16% to 18% swing in the subjects’ proclivity to take risk —
a change that is consistent with a one-category shift in the HL scale
pictured in Figure 2, or just under one-half of a standard deviation in
HL score. But in any event, regardless of representativeness of either
sample, the estimated effect appears to be consistent and economically
significant across them.
Overall, the above analysis suggests that our manipulation appears
to have generated a material contextual shift to subjects’ risk tolerances,
consistent with our hypothesis. Averaged across all subjects, the
manipulation induces a larger propensity to pursue the risky choice by
approximately ten percentage points. When one controls for variation
related to the subjects’ underlying risk aversion, these estimates get
even larger, and it appears to be relatively consistent across
specifications, and strongly statistically significant under any
conventional measures. The only control variable that appears stronger
than the manipulation is whether the subject was an M-Turk subject.
Which group is the “better” one for purposes of external validity is, of
course, debatable. Some studies have found U.S.-based M-Turkers who
participate in experiments to be more representative of the U.S.
population than conventional student samples, and that M-Turkers pay
as much attention to experimental tasks as undergraduates in a lab.110

V. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Our findings have important implications, both for what they add
to the experimental analysis of law and for a variety of practical legal
policy debates around innovative activities. This Part explores several
of those broader implications, as well as potential caveats. First, we
offer an interpretation of how our results fit into the experimental
literature more broadly, focusing on robustness of our experimental
effect and its limitations. We next discuss how our findings intersect
with a variety of ongoing policy debates within intellectual property
and corporate law about how (and whether) law should accommodate
risk preferences. Finally, we discuss the broader potential
consequences of our results.

109. In Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B, we illustrate the robustness of our ordinary least
squares results in Probit and Logit specifications. See infra Appendix B.
110. Gabriele Paolacci, Jesse Chandler & Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, Running Experiments on
Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411, 415 (2010).
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A. Limitations and Robustness
Although the previous section has already explored one principal
area of robustness of our results (i.e., whether they carry over to
contexts where subjects could lose money), there are a variety of other
avenues that merit brief exploration, all having to do with the outer
limits or boundaries of the framing effect we identify. This subsection
briefly explores several of them.
1. Invest in Invention Frame
The Invest in Invention frame highlighted in the previous section
triggers what appears to be a noteworthy shock to manifest risk
tolerance. But that result, in turn, raises the interesting and obvious
question about which element of our frame is the culprit: Is it the
“invest” portion, the “invention” portion, or perhaps a little of both?
Because our baseline experiment employed the prompt “invest in a
hypothetical invention,”111 it does not allow us (yet) to pick apart the
contributions of each attribute. To test one aspect of this quandary —
whether the crucial frame is “invest” or “invest in invention” — we ran
an additional set of experiments to concentrate on a single element (in
this case the “invest” part). We reran the experiment with a new sample
(n = 184), but this time we provided our treatment subjects with a
different set of instructions, telling them only that the risky choice
coincided with an opportunity to “invest” in a risky choice; no
possibility of an invention coming out of the investment was
mentioned. Our new treatment vignette thus read as follows:
Before filling out a brief questionnaire, you will be
given [$8] either to Keep or to Invest. You will have
only a single opportunity to choose. If you choose to
Invest there is a 1/3 chance that your earnings will be
[$30], and a 2/3 chance that your earnings will be [$3].
A roll of a die will determine your earnings, either
[$30] or [$3]. If you choose to Keep you will keep the
[$8].
We then compared the results for this modified treatment group to
a control group who had been given the Simple Lottery instructions,
described in Section II.A. These results are given in Figure 4. Unlike in
the prior analyses, here the “Invest” framing generally has no
statistically significant effect across the different models. Although the
111. We needed to use the word “hypothetical” to avoid misleading some subjects into
believing that there was a real invention involved in the experiment.
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effect goes in the same direction as in the baseline experiments, it is
significantly smaller in magnitude. Moreover, as shown in Appendix
B, the insignificant result remains (and even gets a little weaker) after
controlling for other characteristics (such as elicited risk aversion). At
a minimum, we view these results as suggesting that the removal of the
“innovation” component of the frame is critical, and it substantially
nullifies the risk-aversion dampening effect discussed above. If
anything, in fact, this robustness test suggests that the effect of an
innovation frame is even stronger than we advertise.

Figure 4: Robustness Test with Invest (but no Invention) Frame
In Appendix B, we show that the direction of our estimated results
and the significance were qualitatively identical for a variety of
regression specifications.112 Given these additional experiments, we
can rule out, with some confidence, the possibility that the prospect of
“investing” alone is a sufficient factor for generating our main results.
At the same time, it remains possible that the “investing” frame may be
necessary for our results, interacting with the innovation frame to
produce a meaningful combined effect. While we conjecture that an
interaction effect is plausible (and even likely), we leave that
exploration for later work.113

112. See infra Appendix B.
113. We found it challenging — using a sufficiently similar vignette as our baseline
experiment — to design a satisfactory robustness test that dropped the “invest” frame to focus
only on the “invention” component.
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2. Endowment Effects
Second, as noted above, our baseline treatment condition for the
risky investment used the word “keep” to characterize the safe option,
while the control group (the Simple Lottery frame) was offered the
prospect of earning money in both safe and risky options. One might
thus worry that this wording introduced a type of “endowment effect”
unrelated to our principal manipulation that ultimately drives our
results.114
We are relatively confident this concern is unfounded, based on
both a priori reasoning and on an additional robustness check. As to
the former, we observe that the endowment effects literature long ago
identified that the effect usually vanishes when the “endowment” takes
the form of a monetary sum (or a liquid claim on a monetary sum).115
But even if the endowment effect were present in our baseline
experiment, its typical directionality would cause us to understate the
overall size of our findings: Indeed, if subjects in the Invest in Invention
frame thought they were entitled to the $8 before deciding whether to
invest, then they should have been less willing to give up the $8,
causing them to appear to be more risk-averse in the Invest in Invention
frame when compared to the control. However, we find diametrically
opposite behavior. Accounting for an endowment effect (if one even
exists in this context) would only make our detected effect larger.
Nevertheless, in response to several questions along these lines
from other researchers, we explored the issue a bit further, and re-ran a
version of our experiment that focused only on the word “keep.” We
recruited a new set of 202 subjects (all M-Turkers), and gave the
treatment group alternatively worded instructions that read as follows:
Before filling out a brief questionnaire, you will be
given [$8] and asked to make a choice between
Option A and Option B. You will have only a single
opportunity to choose. If you chose Option A, you
will Keep the [$8]. If you chose Option B, there is a
1/3 chance that your earnings will be [$30], and a 2/3
chance that your earnings will be [$3]. A role of a die
will determine your earnings, either [$30] or [$3].

114. Note that some economists and legal scholars doubt the robustness of the empirical
evidence supporting the endowment effect. See generally Klass et al., supra note 66. Other
researchers believe that subjects can debias to overcome any endowment effect. See generally
Jennifer Arlen & Stephan Tontrup, Does the Endowment Effect Justify Legal Intervention?
The Debiasing Effect of Institutions, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 143 (2015). For the purpose of this
discussion, we will assume that the endowment effect — the tendency of people to value what
they own more highly because they own the assets — is real.
115. See generally Klass et al., supra note 66; Arlen et al., supra note 114.

No. 1]

Patently Risky

231

Notice that this variation strips out the Invest in Invention frame
and retains only the “Keep” terminology, so as to isolate any
endowment effects. If the endowment effect is at play (in the opposite
direction as its usual manifestation), we should detect it here.
We then ran the same diagnostics with this additional robustness
check.116 The basic results are pictured in Figure 5. As is shown by the
Figure, subjects in this condition now tend to choose the risky option at
relatively close rates between treatment and control, with no
statistically significant difference between them.117 We consider these
results to add additional experimental support to the a priori reasoning
that our results are unlikely to be an artifact of the endowment effect,
channeled by telling subjects (in the baseline experiment) that they
could “keep” $8.

Figure 5: Robustness Test with Endowment Only Frame
3. No False Preferences
Neoclassical welfare economics tends to assume that preferences
are fixed and stable across contexts. Behavioral economics and
psychology, in contrast, tend to resist that foundational assumption (at
least categorically). This study is an example of the latter group. It is
important to note that we (like many other exercises in behavioral
116. Our control group in this robustness check used the Simple Lottery frame. See supra
Section II.A.
117. For regression results, see infra Appendix D. Per our prior discussion, note that even
the directionality of the (statistically insignificant) difference between treatment and control
groups moves in the opposite direction as one would expect if an endowment effect were
present.
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economics and psychology) cannot definitively determine that only one
set of revealed preferences — e.g., the ones in the Simple Lottery
frame, or in the Invest in Invention frame — is the “true” set of
preferences for purposes of welfare analysis. In fact, both sets of
preferences may be true, just for different settings and contexts. And,
given that each set of preferences is true within its setting, the results
are quite usable for policy purposes. Consider the Invest in Invention
frame, where the experiments explicitly employ the word “invention.”
As illustrated above, subjects became discernibly more willing to take
on the gamble under such a frame. This response could be because
subjects enjoyed feeling that they were part of an exciting enterprise,
leading to new, useful knowledge, and thereby producing higher utility
from the choice.118 There could also be an effect from knowing that
inventions are prosocial, leading to spillover knowledge that helps
society. Both rationales might motivate subjects to prefer the gamble in
the Invest in Invention frame, but not in the stripped-down Simple
Lottery frame. And that enhanced risk tolerance, in turn, motivates a
discussion of a variety of important implications for legal and public
policy (addressed below).
4. M-Turkers and Risk
Finally, our results suggest a potentially important methodological
validation check for using on-line platforms (such as M-Turk) for
experimental data collection. As noted above, experimental researchers
have expressed some doubts about the validity (external and internal)
of using M-Turk subjects — even as many take advantage of the data
source. And we can confirm that M-Turkers do act “differently” from
in-lab subjects. For example, subjects from M-Turk were consistently
more risk-averse than our other subjects. This was true even after
controlling for age, sex, and ethnicity. But in our case, it did not matter
appreciably for our key manipulation: M-Turk subjects changed
behavior in the same way that the other subjects changed in response to
the Invest in Invention frame; all subject groups (M-Turkers and not)
manifested less risk aversion under our treatment condition. We also
investigated whether there were interaction effects between gender and
M-Turk, but the results were insignificant, and did not change the effect
or significance of the Invest in Invention frame. Thus, it appears that
M-Turk can be used to test the effect of frames like the one we used.
However, because there are underlying differences between M-Turk
and laboratory populations, it makes sense to sample from both
populations (at least initially) to confirm that the laboratory and the
118. We note that our subjects were not tasked with actually inventing anything. Rather,
they were asked if they wanted to invest in an invention.
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platform perform similarly enough to allow researchers to use both of
them to run experiments and trust the results.119
B. Broader Implications
Beyond contributing to the stock of knowledge in the experimental
study of law, our results also have implications for a variety of legal
and policy debates. We flag several of them below.
1. Implications for Intellectual Property
As noted in the Introduction, our findings suggest that at least some
of the concerns about recent judicial rulings limiting patentable subject
matter120 may be overblown. A socially desirable patent policy is based,
in part, upon assessing the risk tolerances of investors in inventive
activity.121 Our findings suggest that in innovative environments,
entrepreneurs and investors may be comparatively more tolerant of risk
than previously recognized. Accordingly, we may not need to be as
concerned about providing compensation to investors and inventors so
as to ameliorate their risk aversion. In fact, given that patent policy may
already reflect a premium for such previously assumed risk aversion,
the recent judicial decisions restricting patent may actually be more
socially beneficial (or at least less socially harmful) than scholars and
commentators have feared. Of course, our findings do not touch upon
concerns about copying, a separate rationale for the patent incentive.
One may reasonably ask: How is the entire IP ecosystem (and not
just individual actors) implicated by our experiments? To begin to
answer this question, consider a simple example. Assume that there are
an inventor and an investor. Both must participate in order to produce
a positive chance of making a successful invention. The investor
provides some initial money, $A, to the inventor, and then, contingent
on the success of the invention in the marketplace, takes a portion of
the revenues. Similarly, the inventor will need to expend effort valued
at $B to invent. We will assume that failure implies a $0, no salvage,
outcome. Suppose that there is a probability, p, of success, which means

119. This will be the subject of a short paper on methodology that we hope to produce in
the future.
120. See generally Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014); Athena
Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 915 F.3d. 743 (Fed. Cir. 2019); Cleveland Clinic
Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Roche Molecular
Sys., Inc. v. CEPHEID, 905 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial LLC,
818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2015); In re BRCA1- and BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 774
F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2014); PerkinElmer, Inc. v. Intema Ltd., 496 Fed. App’x 65 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
121. See supra Section II.A.2.
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both technological and market success. It follows that in order to induce
the parties to participate even if they are risk-neutral, we would need to
provide each party with sufficient rewards to compensate them for their
foregone investment of capital and effort.
Because this is a joint activity, both parties must anticipate
receiving sufficient compensation to make the invention a real
possibility. Thus, even for risk-neutral parties, a successful invention
$(𝐴+𝐵)
must produce at least
so as to induce both investment and
𝑝

inventive activity.122 How is the return to the invention allocated?
Corporate and commercial rules and practices control how the
monetizable value is split up, affecting the likelihood that both the
investor and inventor receive sufficient compensation.
But what if the investor and/or inventor are risk-averse? In that
case, and holding the inventor’s characteristics fixed for the moment,
adjusting for risk aversion would require increasing the investor’s
reward by an additional risk premium ($𝛼). The size of the risk
premium, moreover, increases with the investor’s risk aversion. A
similar argument applies to the inventor, who would require her own
risk premium ($𝛽). Consequently, for risk-averse parties a successful
invention would have to offer an even larger bounty, of:
$(𝐴 + 𝐵) $(𝛼 + 𝛽)
+
𝑝
𝑝
Our results suggest that the baseline level of risk aversion, as
defined in the Simple Lottery condition, appears to decrease (for
whatever reason) in the Invest in Invention frame. Consequently, the
total added risk premium needed to induce investment and activity,
$(𝛼+𝛽)
, may not be as large as one might otherwise believe in such
𝑝
contexts. This insight, in turn, implies that it may be possible to loosen
some of the patent doctrines that help to produce the returns that help
to provide the money.
This basic policy result — that we can relax some of the
institutional commitments that help to channel risk premiums into
required returns — has important potential implications for various
patent (and copyright) doctrines that attempt (at least implicitly) to
calibrate return to creative effort. These include the doctrine of
equivalents, the availability of injunctive relief, patent duration,
damages, and obviousness. Viewed through the lens of our results, each
122. The traditional “garage inventor” example combines $A/p and $B/p into one person,
and thus makes it very hard to determine what is going on. The garage inventor essentially
invests in her own inventive activity. The text, and our experiments, separate out these
functions.
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of these doctrines could potentially be modulated to fine tune the patent
system, and a careful reconsideration of these doctrines may be
warranted, in light of our evidence that risk aversion may retreat in
these settings. To wit, consider the following.
Doctrine of Equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents permits a
finding of infringement even in circumstances in which an accused
product or process is outside the literal scope of the claimed
invention.123 The product or process can infringe if it is insubstantially
different from the claimed invention, or if it “performs substantially the
same function in substantially the same way to reach the same
result.”124 The doctrine addresses patent scope, and has ebbed and
flowed in its breadth over time. Reducing the scope of the doctrine of
equivalents makes it more difficult for a patentee to prove infringement
and thus is functionally similar to reducing the return premium on a
patent.
Injunctions. In its 2005 eBay v. MercExchange decision, the
Supreme Court made it harder for successful patentees to be awarded
an injunction as a remedy.125 Previously, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit had a practice of granting an injunction to almost all
successful litigating patent holders.126 That is no longer the case.127 The
less likely a patent owner is to receive injunctive relief, the lower the
return on investment. The effects of eBay have been most pronounced
on non-practicing entities (NPEs, sometimes pejoratively called “patent

123. David L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1158 (2011); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The
(Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955, 956 (2007).
124. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608, 610 (1950)
(noting two tests for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents: (1) the function-wayresult test (whether the accused product performs “substantially the same function in
substantially the same way to obtain the same result,”); and (2) the insubstantial differences
test (whether the accused product or process is substantially different from what is patented)
(quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)); see also WarnerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 24–25 (1997).
125. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006).
126. See MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
general rule is that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been
adjudged.”).
127. Injunctive relief in patent cases continues to be a source of controversy. See Ryan T.
Holte & Christopher B. Seaman, Patent Injunctions on Appeal: An Empirical Study of the
Federal Circuit’s Application of eBay, 92 WASH. L. REV. 145 (2017) (providing an empirical
study showing, inter alia, that injunctive patent relief is not routine in the District Courts);
Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 280
(2010) (arguing against the availability of patent injunctions with a formal economic model);
Erik Hovenkamp & Thomas F. Cotter, Anticompetitive Patent Injunctions, 100 MINN. L. REV.
871 (2016) (arguing against patent injunctions for firms that own a patent but neither practice
the patent nor license it on reasonable terms, even if the patent owner produces goods in the
same market as those who practice the patent).
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trolls”).128 But even practicing entities run a risk that an injunction will
not be granted.129 Reducing the likelihood that injunctive relief will
issue to plaintiffs, even plaintiffs who are practicing the patent and
manufacturing products, reduces the premium that the successful
inventor can extract, since it is now harder to hold out in negotiating
with high-valuing licensees.
Duration. Many scholars have argued for using the duration of
patent protection (i.e., the patent term) as a lever to encourage
innovation.130 In general, under current law, patents in the U.S. expire
twenty years from their filing. That term is in accord with various
international treaties.131 Putting aside international comity concerns, 132
patent terms could be adjusted upwards or downwards to fine tune the
premium associated with successful innovations.
Damages Measures. The Federal Circuit has made it harder and
harder for plaintiffs to prove reasonable royalty damages in patent
cases. For instance, the Federal Circuit has required that royalties be
based upon the “smallest saleable unit,” the smallest unit that embodies
the claims of the patent, which may be different from the product sold
in the marketplace.133 Copyright is different, with a form of liquidated
128. Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An
Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1949 (2016); see also Matthew Spitzer, Patent
Trolls, Nuisance Suits, and the Federal Trade Commission, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 75 (2018).
129. See Holte et al., supra note 127; Seaman, supra note 128.
130. See generally M. Rafiquzzaman, The Optimal Patent Term Under Uncertainty, 5
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 233 (1987) (arguing that different types of uncertainty produce different
effects on the optimal patent term); Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year
Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 370–71 (1994) (concluding that a 20-year term from date
of application usually gives patentees more protection than did the old term of 17 years from
date of patent issuance). The term of copyright protection has also been a subject of intense
debate. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldlred and Lochner:
Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE
L.J. 2331 (2003); Dennis S. Karjala, Judicial Review of Copyright Term Extension
Legislation, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 199 (2002); Rufus Pollock, Forever Minus a Day? Some
Theory and Empirics of Optimal Copyright, 6 REV. ECON. RSCH. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES 35
(2009); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989).
131. For a discussion of the TRIPS agreement as it relates to patent duration, see generally
David S. Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur Innovation? An Analysis of Patent Duration and Incentives
to Innovation, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1613 (2008).
132. See generally Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Bruce H. Kobayashi, Douglas H. Ginsburg &
Joshua D. Wright, Extra-Jurisdictional Remedies Involving Patent Licensing, COMPETITION
POL’Y INT’L (Dec. 14, 2016) (explaining the importance of international comity concerns
when considering intellectual property rights).
133. VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[W]hen
claims are drawn to an individual component of a multi-component product, it is the
exception, not the rule, that damages may be based upon the value of the multi-component
product.”); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“This
case provides a good example of the danger of admitting consideration of the entire market
value of the accused [product] where the patented component does not create the basis for
customer demand.”); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2009); John M. Golden, Reasonable Certainty in Contract and Patent Damages, 30 HARV.
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damages available in many situations.134 These statutory damages may
overcompensate copyright holders. The ability to get adequate damages
dramatically affects the return from the invention.
Enhanced Damages. In Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics,
Inc., the Supreme Court in 2016 made it slightly easier to obtain
enhanced damages for willful patent infringement.135 The Supreme
Court ruled that the previous two-part test for finding willfulness was
unduly rigid.136 Furthermore, the Supreme Court lowered the burden of
proof required for a patent owner to prove willful infringement, finding
that willfulness needed to be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence.137 The lower the standard of proof and greater the likelihood
of higher damages for a patent holder, the greater the effective premium
from invention.
Obviousness. Finally, the doctrine of obviousness ensures that
patents are only granted for sufficient leaps over the prior art.138 A
given invention is either obvious or non-obvious, a binary
determination.139 Concerns about “close call” inventions falling just
below the bar add risk and may affect ex ante incentives.140 The line
between obvious inventions and non-obvious ones can be altered to
adjust the patent incentive. Increasing the standard for nonobviousness

J.L. & TECH. 257, 261 (2017) (“[T]he Federal Circuit issued a series of decisions tightening
the evidentiary standards for establishing the value of reasonable royalty damages.”); Jonas
Anderson, Congress as a Catalyst of Patent Reform at the Federal Circuit, 63 AM. U. L. REV.
961, 1000–02 (2014) (discussing a “flurry of noteworthy damages decisions from the Federal
Circuit”).
134. Statutory damages of between $750 and $30,000 per work are available if the author
has registered the work before the infringement began or within three months of publication.
17 U.S.C. §§ 412, 504.
135. Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1926 (2016).
136. Id. at 1932; see also Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Who Reads Patents?, 35 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 421, 421 (2017) (claiming that “few researchers are deterred from reading
patents by concerns about enhanced legal liability”); see generally Brandon M. Reed, Who
Determines What Is Egregious: Judge or Jury: Enhanced Damages After Halo v. Pulse, 34
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 389 (2018) (discussing whether a judge or a jury decides whether willful,
egregious misconduct justifies enhanced damages).
137. Halo Elecs., 136 S. Ct. at 1934 (“‘[P]atent infringement litigation has always been
governed by a preponderance of the evidence standard. . . . Enhanced damages are no
exception.”) (quoting Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 557
(2014)).
138. See, e.g., Ryan T. Holte & Ted Sichelman, Cycles of Obviousness, 105 IOWA L. REV.
107 (2019); Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realist Approach to the Obviousness of
Inventions (Stanford Pub. L. Working Paper, No. 1133169, 2011); Ezra Friedman & Abraham
Wickelgren, Optimal Standards of Proof in Patent Litigation: Infringement and NonObviousness (Northwestern Law & Econ. Rsch. Paper No. 19-07, U. of Texas Law, Law &
Econ. Rsch. Paper No. 591, 2019).
139. But see Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña & Ryan Whalen, A Network Theory of Patentability,
87 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 109 (2019) (arguing that network analysis of obviousness
determinations overcomes the “binary” nature of current doctrine).
140. Id. at 69 (noting the high risk of “hindsight bias” in the factfinder in “reconstructing”
whether the invention is obvious).
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would make it more difficult to obtain patent protection, reducing the
return from the inventive concept.
Any of the aforementioned doctrines (or some combination of
them) represents a potential legal policy tool for altering the size of the
patent incentive. Of course, we are reluctant to conclude on the basis of
a set of experiments that any or all of these areas should be changed to
provide less protection compared to where patent doctrine is now. That
is, we cannot conclude with confidence that the length of IP protection
should be shortened, the doctrine of equivalents should be made
narrower, injunctive relief should be limited, or that damages for
infringement should be capped or reduced. Nevertheless, such
conclusions might follow if we were already convinced that current
patent policy calibrations were close to correct, on average, but
erroneously assumed the parties’ risk preferences were much like
anyone else’s. And we simply cannot be confident about that. The past
two decades have seen a general assault on patent from both the courts
and much of the academy.141 It has gotten to the point where some
General Counsels in tech companies speak of “efficient infringement,”
which essentially means that it is cheaper to infringe than to take a
license because it is so hard for patentees to obtain relief through the
courts.142 If this critique is right — that the assault on patent has gone
141. The discussion in Part I of this Article describes the basic issues. See Jonathan M.
Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1313, 1324
(2017) (“Academic theories concerning the adverse effects of a strong patent system would
be of little practical interest were it not for the fact that policymaking entities have taken
actions under patent or antitrust law, or issued influential statements, that explicitly or
implicitly rely on, or are consistent with, those theories.”); see also Michele Boldrin & David
K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2013); Carl Shapiro, Injunctions,
Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 280 (2010) (arguing against the
availability of patent injunctions with a formal economic model); Carl Shapiro, Patent
Remedies, 106 A M. ECON. REV. 198 (2016). Nowhere has this assault been more powerful
than in the area of Standard Essential Patents. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
Patent Hold Up and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1992 (2007); Colleen V. Chien &
Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(2012); Carl Shapiro & Mark A. Lemley, The Role of Antitrust in Preventing Patent Holdup
(Stan. L. & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 554, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3666211
[https://perma.cc/K4LT-RY49].For a skeptical view of patent holdup, see Alexander
Galetovic, Stephen Haber & Ross Levine, An Empirical Examination of Patent Holdup, 11 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 549 (2015). Patent assertion entities (also known as “trolls”) have
generated a lot of criticism as well. See generally Spitzer, supra note 128.
142. Conversation with General Counsel, Fortune 500 technology company (May 2014);
conversation with Associate General Counsel, small technology company (May 2015); see
also Joe Nocera, The Patent Troll Smokescreen, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2015),
https://nyti.ms/1KvDFOg [https://perma.cc/B3HF-X2JE] (“[A] new phrase has emerged in
Silicon Valley: ‘efficient infringing.’ That’s the relatively new practice of using a technology
that infringes on someone’s patent, while ignoring the patent holder entirely. And when the
patent holder discovers the infringement and seeks recompense, the infringer responds by
challenging the patent’s validity.” If a lawsuit ensues, the infringer, which is often a big tech
company, has its patent lawyers ready. “Because the courts have largely robbed small
inventors of their ability to seek an injunction — that is, an order requiring that the infringing
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too far — then patent law probably needs to be stronger. What do our
results mean? They mean that Congress does not need to go as far as it
otherwise would when strengthening patent.
2. Implications for Contract Law, Corporate Law, and Other Areas
Another area where our results may have some import is in areas
of corporate and contract law that pertain to the financing and
governance of tech startups. As we noted in Part I, investors in
innovative startups require sufficient returns to compensate them for
their risk of investment and the risk of failure. But how much of a
premium do they really require to take on such risk? How much control
should they be given over the decision as to whether a startup should
opt for a “safe exit” (often through an acquisition) or to continue the
risky path of development for a hoped-for future payday? How is a
corporate board supposed to resolve such disputes when it is required
to maximize value for all shareholders?
As it happens, much of contemporary corporate law is currently in
a state of flux over how to handle fiduciary duties when it comes to this
very dispute between inventors/entrepreneurs and venture-capital
(“VC”) investors of late-stage startups.143 As is typical in such
relationships, founders (and core employees) typically receive common
stock.144 In contrast, VC investors tend to receive preferred stock,
giving them priority in any liquidation.145 In addition, the venture
capitalists’ preferred shares typically enjoy a conversion option that
provides an even greater return should the startup enjoy phenomenal
success.146 A considerable governance difficulty generally emerges
when the company has done well enough to stay afloat, but not much
more. In such circumstances there is a conflict of interest. The outside
VC investors — usually preferred shareholders whose liquidation
preferences are on the line — perceive considerable downside risk from
continuing, and they have a strong preference to accept any purchase
offer that gets close to their liquidation right. On the other hand,
product be removed from the market — the worst that can happen is that the infringer will
have to pay some money. For a rich company like, say, Apple, that’s no big deal.”).
143. See, e.g., Sarath Sanga & Eric Talley, Don't Go Chasing Waterfalls: Fiduciary Duties
in Venture Capital Backed Startups (October 31, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (available
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3666211 [https://perma.cc/8JVJVDPB]).
144. Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 981 (2006) (“The common is held by the founders, employees, angel
investors, and, in certain cases, strategic partners and third-party service providers.”).
145. Id. at 981–82 (“The preferred is held by VCs, who invest in startups almost
exclusively through this type of security. In fact, most venture-backed startups issue a new
series of preferred stock for each round of financing.”).
146. Id. at 982 (“Like most preferred stock, VCs’ preferred shares carry a liquidation
preference and are convertible into common.”).
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common shareholders perceive principally upside risk, and they
strongly prefer to stay in the game, hoping for luck to turn in their
favor.147
From a value-maximizing perspective, of course, an efficient
allocation of fiduciary duties would grant solicitude between common
and preferred shareholders in a way that maximizes their joint payoff,
taking account of their risk preferences. If — as our results suggest —
VC investors in innovative industries exhibit reduced aversion, then it
might well justify putting a heavier thumb on the scale favoring the
party that wishes to avoid exit—usually the founders. And this appears
to be exactly what courts have recently begun to do. Consider, for
example, Delaware Vice Chancellor Laster’s 2017 opinion in Hsu v.
ODN Holding Corp.148 This case was substantially similar to the
situation described above, pitting preferred shareholders, who wished
to exit, against common shareholders, who resisted. Hoping to secure
an exit, the preferred shareholders used their control of the board to
facilitate payment of a contractual redemption right, thereby starving
the firm of capital and effectively forcing an exit.149 After the common
shareholders sued, the VC investors moved to dismiss.150 In denying
that motion, the Vice Chancellor explicitly prioritized the interests of
the common shareholders in the calculus of fiduciary obligations: “[I]t
generally ‘will be the duty of the board, where discretionary judgment
is to be exercised, to prefer the interests of common stock — as the
good faith judgment of the board sees them to be — to the interests
created by the special rights, preferences, etc., of preferred stock.’”151
Based on our experimental findings, Vice Chancellor Laster’s
opinion may make considerable sense. Rather than according outside
investors special treatment (and a premium) associated with their
preference rights, he essentially held that the interests of preferred
stockholders should instead be treated as no more than contractual, with
no implied duty of the board to take account of their idiosyncratic
preferences (including risk aversion).152 The growing body of opinions
such as this effectively allocate how the available surplus from
successful inventions is split between investors and inventors,

147. See Sarath Sanga & Eric Talley, Don't Go Chasing Waterfalls: Fiduciary Duties in
Venture Capital Backed Startups 3–4 (Oct. 31, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3721814 [https://perma.cc/G75B-TPNJ]).
148. Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp., No. 12108, 2017 WL 1437308 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 14, 2017).
149. Id. at *5.
150. Id. at *10.
151. Id. at *22 (quoting Equity-Linked Invs., L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Del.
Ch. 1997)).
152. Id. at *19 (“The fact that some holders of shares might be market participants who are
eager to sell and would prefer a higher near-term market price likewise does not alter the
presumptively long-term fiduciary focus.”).
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particularly in the tech start-up field, shifting that allocation slightly
away from investors and towards inventors.
C. Social Welfare
On a broader level, to the extent our results hold with actual
investors in technology, they are potentially important for society as
well. When a large number of gambles are repeated, each having
significant positive expected value, and they are not overly correlated
with each other, the aggregation of such gambles will almost certainly
produce more wealth for society. Framing the risky choice as an
investment in an invention induced more subjects to choose expected
gambles with positive expected value. This may be good not only for
the individuals; in the case of inventions, where many of the benefits
are external to the particular invention, it is also good for society.
We should be clear about two important limitations of this
argument, even within the scope of our study. First, over a third of our
subjects continued to opt for the certain (i.e., riskless) choice even in
the Invest in Invention frame.153 From a social welfare standpoint, it is
plausibly desirable that all subjects would opt to invest in the invention.
We offered subjects a strongly attractive actuarial gamble — with an
expected value of 12 compared to a certain option of only 8. Thus, some
of our subjects left significant expected value “on the table.” Put
another way, from a social welfare point of view, our subjects could
have done better. Hence, even though the results of our experiments
provide some comfort, one still might be concerned about too much
residual risk aversion. Second, as noted above, for any experimental
approach external validity can (and should) be a concern. We ran our
experiments on a general population of students as well as M-Turkers.
We did not run our experiments on either inventors or on those who
typically invest in inventions (such as professional venture capitalists).
Real-world inventors and investors in inventions might have different
attitudes towards risk than do the general population.154 Part of our
plans for the future include running our experiment on these
populations. Until then, one should be conservative when making
policy prescriptions based on our experimental results.
*

*

*

*

*

153. More precisely, 38.9% (189 out of 486 subjects) took the certain choice in our
experiments, combining the loss and no-loss versions. Considering only the no-loss
experiments, 35.8% (111 out of 310 subjects) took the certain choice.
154. We also did not have subjects actually try to invent anything, preferring to keep the
experimental design simple. In the future, we may incorporate a creative task as part of the
experiment.
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To sum up, our experiments suggested that people appear to behave
in decidedly less risk-averse ways when placed in a frame that entails
having them invest in an invention, rather than a Simple Lottery frame.
This result might lead us to worry less about the “risk” problem of
inducing individuals to invest in inventions, concentrating, instead, on
the copying problem. Particular doctrines in patent and corporate law
could be modified, based on our results. Thus, there may be a public
policy payoff to our results. Again, we should caution against relying
too strongly on these implications at this stage. More work needs to be
done. Still, we find the direction of the implications to be both
intriguing and worthy of policymakers’ attention.

VI. CONCLUSION
A central challenge to formulating sound legal policy is calibrating
institutions to provide appropriate incentives around activities of
interest. Such design calculus is inherently difficult, and it is often
complicated by the perceived need to account for how risk preferences
affect actors’ behavior. In certain domains that are known to be riskintensive (such as in innovation industries), this added complexity can
be daunting. The experiments detailed in this Article deliver several
new results, the most robust of which is directly pertinent to this policydesign question. When people confront a risky choice that is framed in
the context of investing in an invention, an interesting phenomenon
emerges: subjects become significantly less risk-averse in their
decision-making, taking on risky projects that they would eschew if
framed differently. Our experimental results appear to be robust to a
variety of demographic variables (e.g., gender, age, subject
population), as well as certain situational ones (e.g., the prospect of
losing money on the risky gamble). However, they appear to depend
critically on the contextual nature of the frame: removing the
“invention” component of the framing, for example, causes the effect
to dissipate.
To the extent our results are generalizable, they have material
implications for legal policy. They suggest that — at least in pertinent
domains — accounting for risk aversion may be slightly less critical
than in other risky contexts. Consequently, policy makers in such
domains may be able to narrow their sights (at least a little) to
concentrate on the other elements of legal and regulatory design that
are of first-order importance.
We view these findings as contributing to a still small but growing
body of experimental work on intellectual property and its role in
economics, psychology and law. Many of the most interesting
questions, having to do with the responsiveness of investment to the
strength of patent protection and how scientists respond to incentives
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to invent, remain largely unexplored terrain. And embarking on that
quest is a risk we should all be willing to take.
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APPENDIX A: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND
IDENTIFICATION
As a theoretical matter, we represent subject choices within a
generalized expected utility (GEU) choice-theoretic framework.155 In
our framework, our experimental manipulation (the Invest in Invention
frame) represents a controlled shock to subjects’ underlying risk
preferences, possibly inducing them to think about risk aversion
differently than they would otherwise behave were the equivalent
economic choice framed as a strict gamble.
The discussion below proceeds in two stages. First, we discuss the
underlying choice-theoretic framework, and the predicted effect of the
manipulation. Second, we consider an empirical calibration and
identification strategy and we give results from the first set of
“baseline” experiments.
A. Choice Theoretic Framework
Our aggregate results can also be situated in a decision-theoretic
context, where one can conceive of the Invest in Invention frame as
causing a downward shift in subjects’ manifest risk aversion, thereby
causing them to embrace a risky choice more readily than they would
in the absence of the manipulation. Below, we develop a framework for
controlling for subjects’ baseline risk aversion parameter (𝛼0 ) and other
demographic variables (𝑋𝑖 ) in order to estimate the local average
treatment effect of a downward shock (𝜆 < 0) that an experimental
condition might introduce (i.e., revealed risk aversion goes down in the
presence of the manipulation).
Suppose that the relevant population exhibits CRRA preferences
scaled by a (type dependent) CRRA risk aversion parameter 𝛼(𝑋𝑖 ), so
that:
𝛼(𝑋𝑖 ) = 𝛼0 + 𝜆 ∙ 𝜏𝑖 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑋𝑖 + ε𝑖 ,
where 𝜏𝑖 is a dummy variable set to one if the subject is assigned to the
treatment group, and ε𝑖 represents a noise term (which we assume to be
have zero mean and to be distributed according to the cumulative
distribution function for the population, Φ(ε𝑖 )).156
155. See Colin Camerer & Eric Talley, Experimental Study of Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 1619, 1625–26 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007)
(“[T]he crucial component of generalizability is whether a theory draws a clear distinction
between an artificial experimental environment and a naturally-occurring one.”).
156. A natural assumption given the structure of our data is that ε𝑖 is normally distributed
(implying a Probit specification), but it easily confirmed that a variety of other distributional
assumptions for Φ(ε𝑖 ) work as well.
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It is important to note that our experimental data on risk
preferences can be compared to that found in the prior literature more
generally. We could deploy this literature in two ways. Under the first
(a “bootstrapping”) approach, we would use the baseline preference
parameter estimates from pre-existing studies to impose similar
structural constraints on the risk preference distributions of our own
subjects. Under the second, we would use the results of the literature as
a rough benchmark of comparison for our own sample of subjects, but
then (after ensuring rough comparability) use our subjects’ own
behaviors to identify the distribution of preferences. The advantage of
the first approach is that it facilitates comparability of our results to the
existing literature. The advantage of the second approach is that it
allows us to control for an assortment of variables (e.g., demographic
differences) that might be predictive of risk aversion but not easily
observed in summary statistics reported in the existing literature.
We employ the latter approach. Below, we first confirm that our
experimental data appear comparable to what has been found in prior
literature, focusing particularly on HL as a benchmark; and second,
having found our experimental control group data to be comparable, we
proceed to use those data as a baseline for teasing out the effect of our
manipulation.
Each subject i is presumed to have individual risk preference
characteristics summarized by a (potentially type-dependent) risk
aversion parameter 𝛼(𝑋𝑖 ) ϵ ℝ, where 𝑋𝑖 represents a vector of subject
characteristics (e.g., demographics). While 𝛼(𝑋𝑖 ) could take any
functional form, we will frequently concentrate on linear relationships,
so that:
𝛼(𝑋𝑖 ) = 𝛼0 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑋𝑖 ,
where 𝛼0 is a constant representing a “baseline” level of risk aversion
and 𝛽 is a vector of coefficients on subject characteristics 𝑋𝑖 .
In both treatment and control groups, the subject faces a choice
between a “sure thing” (ST) and a “risky venture” (RV). Project ST
pays off 𝑉 > 0 with certainty, while RV pays off 𝑉𝐻 > 𝑉 with
probability 𝑞 and 𝑉𝐿 ϵ (0, 𝑉) with probability (1 − 𝑞), where 𝑞 ϵ (0,1).
We assume that 𝑞𝑉𝐻 + (1 − 𝑞)𝑉𝐿 > 𝑉, so that an unbiased, risk-neutral
party would always prefer RV to ST. As noted above, the experimental
vignette set forth V = $8; VH = $30; VL = $3; and q = 1/3, which clearly
satisfies this condition.
We suppose for concreteness that subjects are heterogeneously
risk-averse, exhibiting constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
functions. Equivalently, the utility subject i gets from realized income
𝑦𝑖 , or 𝑢(𝑦𝑖 ; 𝛼𝑖 ), can be represented as follows:
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𝑦𝑖 1−𝛼(𝑋𝑖)
1 − 𝛼(𝑋𝑖 )

This function converges to ln (𝑦𝑖 ) as 𝛼(𝑋𝑖 ) ⟶ 1. The special case
of 𝛼(𝑋𝑖 ) = 0 corresponds to risk neutrality, while 𝛼(𝑋𝑖 ) > 0
corresponds to risk aversion, and 𝛼(𝑋𝑖 ) < 0 corresponds to a
preference for risk.
Given this set of preferences, subject i will (weakly) prefer the
risky venture (RV) to the sure thing (ST) if and only if:
𝑉𝐻 1−𝛼(𝑋𝑖)
𝑉𝐿 1−𝛼(𝑋𝑖)
𝑢(𝑅𝑉; 𝛼(𝑋𝑖 )) = 𝑞 ∙
+ (1 − 𝑞) ∙
1 − 𝛼(𝑋𝑖 )
1 − 𝛼(𝑋𝑖 )
≥

𝑉1−𝛼(𝑋𝑖)
= 𝑢(𝑆𝑇; 𝛼(𝑋𝑖 )),
1 − 𝛼(𝑋𝑖 )

or equivalently:
𝑞 ∙ 𝑉𝐻 1−𝛼(𝑋𝑖) + (1 − 𝑞) ∙ 𝑉𝐿 1−𝛼(𝑋𝑖) ≥ 𝑉1−𝛼(𝑋𝑖)
Given our parameterization, there is a unique risk aversion level,
𝛼(𝑋𝑖 ) = 𝛼 ∗ , in which the above expression is satisfied at equality, and
the subject is indifferent between ST and RV. She thus prefers ST when
𝛼(𝑋𝑖 ) > 𝛼 ∗ , and prefers RV when 𝛼(𝑋𝑖 ) < 𝛼 ∗ . For the specific
numerical values utilized in our experimental setting,157 it is easily
verified that the unique indifference point occurs at 𝛼 ∗ ≈ 0.66.
We represent our experimental manipulation as potentially
introducing a “shock” to the baseline level of risk aversion, or 𝛼0 from
above, to a new value 𝛼1 = 𝛼0 + 𝜆 < 𝛼0 . Note that because our Invest
in Invention frame is designed to reduce manifest aversion to risk, we
hypothesize the shock to be negative, so that 𝜆 < 0. The shock need not
affect all subjects equally: For infra- and extra-marginal subjects (for
whom risk aversion 𝛼(𝑋𝑖 ) was much less or much greater than the
critical switch value 𝛼 ∗ ), the manipulation will not affect preference
orderings. However, for near “marginal” subjects where 𝛼(𝑋𝑖 ) is in the
vicinity of 𝛼 ∗ , our manipulation can induce a change in behavior from
favoring ST to favoring RV. That is, denoting the dummy variable 𝜏𝑖
to represent assignment to the control (0) or treatment (1) group, we
would expect to find a group of subjects for which:

157. I.e., V = $8; VH = $30; VL = $3; and q = 1/3.
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𝛼0 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜆 < 𝛼 ∗ < 𝛼0 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑋𝑖
In other words, if our manipulation has the effect we posit, we
would expect a disproportional preference for RV relative to ST in the
treatment group compared to the control group. We therefore seek an
identification strategy that will allow us to estimate 𝜆, and to test the
null hypothesis that 𝜆 = 0 against the (one-sided) alternative that 𝜆 <
0.
B. Calibration to the Literature
As noted above, one unavoidable limitation of drawing on results
from prior literature is that granular information on the subjects’
demographics (or the 𝑋𝑖 s) is rarely if ever reported in usable form.
Thus, the best one can do is to benchmark on summary statistics
(effectively dropping all of the 𝑋𝑖 s other than a dummy variable
indicating whether the subject was in our experimental control group).
Moreover, in both our experiment and in the prior literature, one
cannot observe subjects’ true baseline values of 𝛼0 . The best one can
do is to infer plausible ranges of values from revealed preference
orderings within a specific hypothetical vignette. A common vignette
in the literature concerns the “switch point” on the HL scale at which
the probability of a successful outcome grows sufficiently favorable
that a subject first chooses the high-variance project (Option B in the
table below, with respective high and low payoffs of VHH and VLL) over
the low variance project (Option A, with respective payoffs of VH and
VL, where VH <VHH and VL >VLL). Specifically, if the subject first
switches from Option A to Option B when the success probability is
equal to qk , it follows that:
𝑞𝑘 ∙ 𝑉𝐻𝐻 1−𝛼 + (1 − 𝑞𝑘 ) ∙ 𝑉𝐿𝐿 1−𝛼 ≥ 𝑞𝑘 ∙ 𝑉𝐻 1−𝛼 + (1 − 𝑞𝑘 ) ∙ 𝑉𝐿 1−𝛼
Because the subject did not switch at success probability 𝑞𝑘−1 , it
must also be true that:
𝑞𝑘−1 ∙ 𝑉𝐻𝐻 1−𝛼 + (1 − 𝑞𝑘−1 ) ∙ 𝑉𝐿𝐿 1−𝛼
< 𝑞𝑘−1 ∙ 𝑉𝐻 1−𝛼 + (1 − 𝑞𝑘−1 ) ∙ 𝑉𝐿 1−𝛼
Plugging the numerical values from Table 1A into each of these
expressions and then solving for the unknown coefficient 𝛼 allows one
to use the first switch point to infer plausible ranges of risk aversion
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coefficient values (𝛼), depicted in the final column of the table
below:158
Table 1A: Holt-Laury (2002) Risk-Aversion Elicitation Bins
Option A (Low Variation)
10% chance of $2.00 and 90%
chance of $1.60
20% chance of $2.00 and 80%
chance of $1.60
30% chance of $2.00 and 70%
chance of $1.60
40% chance of $2.00 and 60%
chance of $1.60
50% chance of $2.00 and 50%
chance of $1.60
60% chance of $2.00 and 40%
chance of $1.60
70% chance of $2.00 and 30%
chance of $1.60
80% chance of $2.00 and 20%
chance of $1.60
90% chance of $2.00 and 10%
chance of $1.60
100% chance of $2.00 and 0%
chance of $1.60

Option B (High Variation)
10% chance of $3.85 and 90%
chance of $0.10
20% chance of $3.85 and 80%
chance of $0.10
30% chance of $3.85 and 70%
chance of $0.10
40% chance of $3.85 and 60%
chance of $0.10
50% chance of $3.85 and 50%
chance of $0.10
60% chance of $3.85 and 40%
chance of $0.10
70% chance of $3.85 and 30%
chance of $0.10
80% chance of $3.85 and 20%
chance of $0.10
90% chance of $3.85 and 10%
chance of $0.10
100% chance of $3.85 and 0%
chance of $0.10

Switch Point => α
α ≤ -1.713
-1.713 < α ≤ -0.947
-0.947 < α ≤ -0.487
-0.487 < α ≤ -0.143
-0.143 < α ≤ 0.146
0.146 < α ≤ 0.411
0.411 < α ≤ 0.676
0.676 < α ≤ 0.971
0.971 < α ≤ 1.368
α > 1.368

In addition, we must further allow for the possibility that a subject
would never switch within the HL experimental protocol, even when
the chance of the high payoff reached 100%. This is no doubt
inconsistent with any type of rational choice theoretically, but we found
that approximately 2.7 percent of our subjects never switched to option
B in our HL elicitation. We therefore place these subjects into an 11th
bin, which we call 𝐴11 , and which cannot be rank-ordered against the
others.159 Through the HL elicitation question, we observe a series of
dummy variables 𝑧𝑖,𝑘 , which reflect whether bin 𝐴𝑘 contains the first
bin at which i switches to Option B, for bins 𝑘 ∈ {1,2, … ,10,11}.
To assess our experimental data side-by-side against the HL
results, we simulated a data set replicating the summary statistics of
HL. Because the HL data do not include any granular controls, we
control (at this stage) only for a single dummy variable: whether the
subject was part of our experimental data, and in particular part of the

158. The HL elicitation subdivides the risk aversion domain A into K=10 ordered “bins”
coinciding with:
{𝐴1 |𝐴2 … 𝐴9 |𝐴10 } ={(−∞, −1.713]|(−1.713, −0.947]| … |(0.971,1.368]|(1.368, ∞)}
159. Our results change little if the “never switch” subjects are dropped entirely from our
data set.
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Figure 1A: Subjects’ Holt-Laury Switch Bins (Solid Lines; Gains Only & Lose-Money
Condition) versus Original Holt-Laury (2002) Switch Distribution (Dotted Lines)

control group. Note that if the error terms are normally distributed, an
ordered probit is the natural choice.

Consider Figure 1A, which illustrates the cumulative frequency of
switch-point bins, both for the four original HL conditions (dashed
lines) and our various experimental baseline subjects (solid lines). As
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can be seen from the figure, our subjects appear to manifest a somewhat
greater degree of risk aversion at the upper end of the HL scale than
most of the HL conditions (other than the 20x real stakes condition).
That said, our subjects appear to behave consistently in a manner that
sits comfortably within the range of responses in HL. Moreover, note
that our treatment and control subjects manifest nearly identical switch
point distributions — a fact that we will utilize in our identification
strategy below. Overall, we consider this to be reasonable grounds to
believe that our data are highly comparable to HL, albeit possibly
skewed slightly (but insignificantly) towards greater risk aversion.160
This comparison provides some comfort that our data are comparable
to prior literature, regardless of whether subjects were randomly
assigned to the control or treatment group.
C. Identification
Let 𝑦𝑖 ϵ {0,1} denote whether the subject takes the {risky, safe}
decision.161 We use the standard limited dependent variable approach
to estimate coefficients underlying the binary choice between projects.
Assume that there is some “latent” risk aversion variable 𝑦̂𝑖 for each
experimental subject, which cannot be observed directly. For subject i
the latent variable is defined by:
𝑦̂𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝜆 ∙ 𝜏𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿𝑧𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
The subject’s action is dictated by this latent variable, such that:
𝑦𝑖 = {

1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦̂𝑖 ≥ 0
0 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒

In the above setup, 𝛼0 is an estimated constant, representing
baseline risk aversion; 𝛽 is a vector of control-variable coefficients on
demographic variables 𝑋𝑖 , and 𝛿 is a vector of “fixed effect”
coefficients for (K-1) of the HL “bins” subjects fall into. Our coefficient
of interest in this expression will be 𝜆, which embodies the marginal
effect of being placed in the innovation “language” treatment group,
(where 𝜏𝑖 = 1), as opposed to the pure risk frame (where 𝜏𝑖 = 0). The
𝜀𝑖 denotes an error term on the latent variable. Because we predict that
160. Beyond eyeballing, we checked whether our subjects appeared comparable to the
simulated HL data based on switching bins in an ordered probit/logit specification. When we
compared the pooled HL data to our control group, we found a modest bias in the direction
of risk aversion among our experimental controls. However, this bias is not statistically
significant under conventional measures (z = 1.55 & 1.63, respectively).
161. Note that we normalize the “safe” decision as 𝑦𝑖 = 1, so that this fits into the standard
framework for limited dependent variables.
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the Invest in Invention frame will make subjects less risk-averse and
more risk-seeking, we will test a null hypothesis that 𝜆 = 0 against the
one-sided alternative that 𝜆 < 0.162
Given the framework from above, the risky choice will be taken
whenever:
𝜀𝑖 ≤ −(𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿𝑧𝑖 + 𝜆𝜏𝑖 )
which occurs with probability:
Φ(

−(𝛼0 +𝛽𝑋𝑖 +𝛿𝑧𝑖 +𝜆𝜏𝑖 )
)
𝜎

And the safe choice will be taken whenever:
𝜀𝑖 > −(𝛼0 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿𝑧𝑖 + 𝜆𝜏𝑖 )
which occurs with probability:
1− Φ(

−(𝛼0+𝛽𝑋𝑖 +𝛿𝑧𝑖 +𝜆𝜏𝑖 )
)
𝜎

Suppose that out of our N subjects, we observe n<N of them choose
the safe choice (𝑦𝑖 = 1) and the remaining N-n choose the risky choice
(𝑦𝑖 = 0). The appropriate likelihood function is defined as follows:
𝑁

Λ(𝛼0 , 𝛽, 𝛿, 𝜆) = ∏ [Φ (
𝑖=1

−Φ(

−(𝛼0+𝛽𝑋𝑖 +𝛿𝑧𝑖 +𝜆𝜏𝑖 ) 1−𝑦𝑖
)]
𝜎

[1

−(𝛼0 +𝛽𝑋𝑖 +𝛿𝑧𝑖 +𝜆𝜏𝑖 ) 𝑦𝑖
)]
𝜎

The log likelihood function is:

162. One caveat deserves mention here: Because our other control variables (𝑋𝑖 and 𝑧𝑖 ) are
both elicited after the experimental manipulation, it is conceivable that the experimental
manipulation itself affected post-manipulation responses. This fear is less salient with the
demographic variables 𝑋𝑖 , such as age, left-handedness, etc. However, the HL risk aversion
elicitation, 𝑧𝑖 , might well be altered by being assigned to the treatment or control group. Were
this to happen, it would likely attenuate any results we find, which is good news for us. That
said, this possible treatment effect on an RHS variable is worth keeping in mind in interpreting
the regressions below; we will thus consider specifications that both exclude and include fixed
effects for HL bins reported by the subjects. We note, however, that the HL elicitations from
our experimental control and treatment subjects appear virtually identical, giving us some
confidence that the HL bins are not infected by our experimental manipulation shown in
Figure 1.
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ln(Λ(𝛼0 , 𝛽, 𝛿, 𝜆)) =
𝑁

∑(1 − 𝑦𝑖 ) ∙ ln (Φ (

−(𝛼0 +𝛽𝑋𝑖 +𝛿𝑧𝑖 +𝜆𝜏𝑖 )
)) +
𝜎

𝑦𝑖

𝑖=1

∙ ln (1 − Φ (

−(𝛼0+𝛽𝑋𝑖 +𝛿𝑧𝑖 +𝜆𝜏𝑖 )
))
𝜎

The maximum likelihood approach chooses 𝛼0 , 𝛽, 𝛿, 𝜆 — as well
as 𝜎 — to maximize the above function. As before, given our normality
assumptions on 𝜀𝑖 , a Probit specification is appropriate.
As noted above, if the Invest in Invention frame has no effect, then
one would predict 𝜆 = 0. If, in contrast, treatment makes subjects less
risk-averse and more risk-preferring on the margin, then we would
predict 𝜆 < 0, we will test the null hypothesis that 𝜆 = 0 against the
one-sided alternative that 𝜆 < 0.
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APPENDIX B: ROBUSTNESS TEST: KEEP VS. INVEST IN
INVENTION
The following tables report on alternative probit and logit
estimations of Tables 6 and 7 in the text, which used OLS linear
probability models. Converting to average marginal effects, these
estimates imply that for a subject with a median level of risk aversion,
we would predict a 16% to 18% lower rate of opting for the certain
option when in the invention frame.

Chi-sqd
p
N
HL Switch FE

CONSTANT

MALE x TURK

TURK

ETHNICITY

HAND

MALE

AGE

GAMBLED

INVENTION FRAME

Probit 5
Probit 4
Probit 3
Probit 2
-0.421*** -0.421*** -0.384*** -0.488**
(-2.41)
(-2.80)
(-3.10)
(-3.11)
-0.125
-0.049
0.064
(-0.77)
(-0.31)
(0.44)
0.004
0.027***
(0.40)
(3.40)
-0.159
-0.059
(-1.08)
(-0.42)
-0.056
-0.052
(-0.29)
(-0.28)
0.139
0.181
(0.82)
(1.07)
0.626*
(2.32)

Logit 4
Logit 3
Logit 2
Logit 1
Probit 6
-0.470* -0.685*** -0.686*** -0.646***
-0.487**
(-2.77)
(-3.01)
(-3.01)
(-2.31)
(-2.41)
-0.097
0.115
-0.122
(-0.36)
(0.47)
(-0.76)
0.047***
0.002
(3.41)
(0.19)
-0.07
-0.018
(-0.29)
(-0.09)
-0.084
-0.056
(-0.26)
(-0.29)
0.316
0.126
(1.11)
(0.74)
0.836**
(2.53)
-0.304
(-1.05)
-0.81
0.321
0.412
-0.23
-0.093
-0.081
-0.471
0.202
0.254
-0.144
(-1.15)
(0.49)
(0.65)
(-1.62)
(-0.21)
(-0.18)
(-1.05)
(0.49)
(0.64)
(-1.62)
68.9
66.658
66.627
5.314
92.718
92.892
76.842
74.127
74.016
5.335
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
412
412
412
412
412
412
412
412
412
412
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Table B1: Baseline Experiments - Probit and Logit Specifications when Losing Money Not Possible
T-Statistics in Parentheses
+ = Significant at 5% (one tailed test); 10% (two tailed test)
* = Significant at 2.5% (one tailed test); 5% (two tailed test)
** = Significant at 1% (one tailed test); 2% (two tailed test)
*** = Significant at 0.5% (one tailed test); 1% (two tailed test)
Probit 1
-0.291*
(-2.31)

-0.15
(-0.21)
81.338
0.00
412
Yes

Logit 5
-0.849*
(-2.32)
-0.209
(-0.74)
0.008
(0.48)
-0.251
(-0.99)
-0.1
(-0.30)
0.265
(0.92)
1.003*
(2.23)

Logit 6
-0.851**
(-2.34)
-0.208
(-0.74)
0.004
(0.25)
0.011
(0.03)
-0.094
(-0.28)
0.239
(0.83)
1.363**
(2.48)
-0.533
(-1.07)
-0.168
(-0.24)
80.747
0.00
412
Yes
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APPENDIX C: ROBUSTNESS TEST: KEEP VS. INVEST
Table C1: Robustness Experiments - Invest with no Invention (OLS
Estimates)

INVENTION
FRAME

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

-0.015

-0.008

-0.005

-0.019

-0.019

(-0.21)

(-0.11)

(-0.07)

(-0.26)

(-0.26)

GAMBLED

0.077

0.062

0.062

(0.89)

(0.73)

(0.73)

AGE

GENDER

0.005

0.005

(1.48)

(1.48)

-0.023

-0.023

(-0.31)

(-0.31)

HAND

ETHNICITY

CONSTANT

Model 5

0.1

0.1

(0.86)

(0.86)

-0.137

-0.137

(-1.31)

(-1.31)

0.611***

0.576***

0.508**

0.405

0.405

(11.83)

(2.93)

(2.44)

(1.60)

(1.60)

R-sqd

0.00

0.059

0.064

0.097

0.097

p

0.832

0.149

0.222

0.045

0.045

N

184

184

184

184

184

HL Switch FE

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

T-Statistics in Parentheses
+ = Significant at 5% (one tailed test); 10% (two tailed test)
* = Significant at 2.5% (one tailed test); 5% (two tailed test)
** = Significant at 1% (one tailed test); 2% (two tailed test)
*** = Significant at 0.5% (one tailed test); 1% (two tailed test)
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APPENDIX D: ROBUSTNESS TEST: ENDOWMENT ONLY
Table D1: Robustness Experiments Endowment Only (OLS
Estimates)

KEEP
LANGUAGE

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

-0.051

-0.036

-0.038

-0.046

-0.05

(-0.73)

(-0.52)

(-0.54)

(-0.65)

(-0.71)

-0.046

-0.046

-0.02

(-0.50)

(-0.50)

(-0.22)

GAMBLED

AGE

0.003

0.001

(0.77)

(0.35)

GENDER

-0.131+
(-1.76)

HAND

0.01
(0.08)

ETHNICITY

0.012
(0.12)

CONSTANT

0.461***

0.669***

0.702***

0.617***

0.675***

(9.29)

(4.80)

(4.57)

(3.22)

(3.29)

R-sqd

0.003

0.103

0.105

0.107

0.123

p

0.094

0.469

0.010

0.011

0.016

N

202

202

202

202

202

HL Switch FE

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

T-Statistics in Parentheses:
+ = Significant at 5% (one tailed test); 10% (two tailed test)
* = Significant at 2.5% (one tailed test); 5% (two tailed test)
** = Significant at 1% (one tailed test); 2% (two tailed test)
*** = Significant at 0.5% (one tailed test); 1% (two tailed test)

